https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:55:12 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333478 EUVD-2026-333478 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333478 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43865 <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.</p> <p>The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast&#39;s JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast&#39;s own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel&#39;s default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.</p> <p>Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are o…</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.</p> <p>The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast&#39;s JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast&#39;s own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel&#39;s default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.</p> <p>Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are o…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43865 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xww8-mxqw-m84w <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.</p> <p>The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast&#39;s JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast&#39;s own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel&#39;s default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.</p> <p>Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are o…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-hazelcast</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.</p> <p>The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast&#39;s JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast&#39;s own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel&#39;s default configuration. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.</p> <p>Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are o…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xww8-mxqw-m84w https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203