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BELL-CVE-2026-43472

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

certfr-2026-avi-0696 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…

certfr-2026-avi-0696

EUVD-2026-315962

fkie_cve-2026-43472

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling

There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]

> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.

Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1).

We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.

They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.

There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it h…

GHSA-vgv8-2mh4-qh7r

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling

> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.

Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1).

OESA-2026-2493 — kernel security update

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()

In flush_write_buffer, &p->frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store function is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store(). This function called filp_open(), following which these functions were called (in reverse order), according to the call trace:

down_read __configfs_open_file do_dentry_open vfs_open do_open path_openat do_filp_open file_open_name filp_open target_core_item_dbroot_store flush_write_buffer configfs_write_iter

target_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by trying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug report shows:

db_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot

indicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it is currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore of the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in flush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner and a possibility of recursive locking.

Fix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path() instead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific function __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix compatible.(CVE-2026-23292)…

openSUSE-SU-2026:21555-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

SUSE-SU-2026:22521-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-43472

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 232 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] > I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1). We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn't b…

WID-SEC-W-2026-1454 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.