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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:36:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-43323</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-43323</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-43323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-315887</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-315887</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-315887</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-315887</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-43323</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43323</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and
managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b (&amp;#34;sched/fair: Fix
zero_vruntime tracking&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to
hypothesize the following scenario:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be
eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in
between these two entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full
slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over
the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no
longer. So we schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the
__{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the
fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the
critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick&amp;#39;s worth of
time, we&amp;#39;re up a creek.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee
the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically
speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the
possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of
time -- however unlike…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and
managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b (&amp;#34;sched/fair: Fix
zero_vruntime tracking&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to
hypothesize the following scenario:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be
eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in
between these two entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full
slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over
the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no
longer. So we schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the
__{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the
fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the
critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick&amp;#39;s worth of
time, we&amp;#39;re up a creek.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee
the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically
speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the
possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of
time -- however unlike…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-549j-xvh5-g4r6</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-549j-xvh5-g4r6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and
managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b (&amp;#34;sched/fair: Fix
zero_vruntime tracking&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to
hypothesize the following scenario:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be
eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in
between these two entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full
slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over
the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no
longer. So we schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the
__{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the
fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the
critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick&amp;#39;s worth of
time, we&amp;#39;re up a creek.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee
the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically
speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the
possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of
time -- however unlike…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and
managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b (&amp;#34;sched/fair: Fix
zero_vruntime tracking&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to
hypothesize the following scenario:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be
eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in
between these two entities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full
slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over
the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no
longer. So we schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the
__{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the
fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the
critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick&amp;#39;s worth of
time, we&amp;#39;re up a creek.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee
the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically
speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the
possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of
time -- however unlike…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-549j-xvh5-g4r6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-2868 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-2868</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; value
determined from the user mapping of the target &amp;amp;apos;pfn&amp;amp;apos; being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
  | ...
  | Call trace:
  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extract only the memory type from the user &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we&amp;amp;apos;re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().(CVE-2026-23346)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ice: change…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; value
determined from the user mapping of the target &amp;amp;apos;pfn&amp;amp;apos; being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
  | ...
  | Call trace:
  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extract only the memory type from the user &amp;amp;apos;pgprot_t&amp;amp;apos; in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we&amp;amp;apos;re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().(CVE-2026-23346)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ice: change…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-2868</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-43323</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-43323</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 86 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b (&amp;#34;sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking&amp;#34;). The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to hypothesize the following scenario: Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in between these two entities. Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no longer. So we schedule. Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the __{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime. All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue. This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick&amp;#39;s worth of time, we&amp;#39;re up a creek. Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of time -- however unlikely. There…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 86 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b (&amp;#34;sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking&amp;#34;). The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to hypothesize the following scenario: Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in between these two entities. Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no longer. So we schedule. Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the __{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime. All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue. This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick&amp;#39;s worth of time, we&amp;#39;re up a creek. Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of time -- however unlikely. There…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-43323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1454 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1454</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1454</guid>
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