https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 16:32:46 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-jupyterlab-2026-42557 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: jupyterlab</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: jupyterlab</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-jupyterlab-2026-42557 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-42557 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-42557 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-cb04703 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: tensorflow-gpu-jupyter</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the tensorflow-gpu-jupyter package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: tensorflow-gpu-jupyter</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the tensorflow-gpu-jupyter package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-cb04703 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361087 EUVD-2026-361087 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361087 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42557 <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42557 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab, PyPI: notebook</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab, PyPI: notebook</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10748-1 <p>jupyter-jupyterlab-4.5.7-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>jupyter-jupyterlab-4.5.7-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10748-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2537 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2537 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:43038 <p>jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass python-dotenv: python-dotenv: Arbitrary file overwrite via symbolic link following mistune: Mistune: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via crafted Markdown input net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Unauthorized File Access via Path Traversal Vulnerability net/mail: golang: Go net/mail: Denial of Service via crafted email inputs golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) bypass via improper Origin header validation Jupyter Notebook: JupyterLab: @jupyter-notebook/help-extension: @jupyterlab/help-extension: Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab: Session takeover via stored cross-site scripting jupyterlab: JupyterLab: Arbitrary code execution due to improper enforcement of extension allow-list net/mail: golang: net/mail…</p> <p>jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass python-dotenv: python-dotenv: Arbitrary file overwrite via symbolic link following mistune: Mistune: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via crafted Markdown input net: golang: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Unauthorized File Access via Path Traversal Vulnerability net/mail: golang: Go net/mail: Denial of Service via crafted email inputs golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing jupyter-server: Jupyter Server: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) bypass via improper Origin header validation Jupyter Notebook: JupyterLab: @jupyter-notebook/help-extension: @jupyterlab/help-extension: Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab: Session takeover via stored cross-site scripting jupyterlab: JupyterLab: Arbitrary code execution due to improper enforcement of extension allow-list net/mail: golang: net/mail…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:43038 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-42557 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:25.10: jupyterlab, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: jupyterlab</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:25.10: jupyterlab, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: jupyterlab</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-42557