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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 16:54:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-333483</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333483</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-333483</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333483</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42527</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&amp;#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39;, or the no-&amp;#39;javax.**&amp;#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &amp;#39;java.**&amp;#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&amp;#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&amp;#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39;, or the no-&amp;#39;javax.**&amp;#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &amp;#39;java.**&amp;#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&amp;#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8h6p-jvhf-9hcr — Apache Camel: Permissive default ObjectInputFilter pattern admits java.net.** and enables DNS-based information disclos…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8h6p-jvhf-9hcr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-jms, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-sjms, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-amqp, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-mina, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-netty, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-infinispan, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-leveldb, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-cassandraql and 2 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&amp;#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39;, or the no-&amp;#39;javax.**&amp;#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &amp;#39;java.**&amp;#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&amp;#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-jms, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-sjms, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-amqp, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-mina, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-netty, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-infinispan, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-leveldb, Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-cassandraql and 2 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&amp;#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39;, or the no-&amp;#39;javax.**&amp;#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &amp;#39;java.**&amp;#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&amp;#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8h6p-jvhf-9hcr</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:71675 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 4.18.4 for Spring Boot release.</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:71675</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;jetty-security: Eclipse Jetty: Authentication bypass via Digest authentication encoding collision jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections org.bouncycastle/bc-java: org.bouncycastle/bc-lts-java: Bouncy Castle for Java: Cryptographic signature bypass in RSA PKCS#1 verification vertx-core: Eclipse Vert.x: Information disclosure via improper handling of HTTP 30x redirects camel-jms: camel-sjms: camel-amqp: camel-mina: camel-netty: camel-netty-http: camel-vertx-http: camel-infinispan: camel-leveldb: camel-cassandraql: camel-consul: camel-sql: Apache Camel: Information disclosure via deserialization of untrusted data camel-aws2-sqs: Apache Camel: Camel-AWS2-SQS: Inbound message attributes are mapped into the Exchange without an inbound HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing a message sender to inject Camel control headers camel-nats: Apache Camel: Camel-NATS: Inbound NATS message headers are mapped into the Exchange without a configured HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing a client that can publish to the subject to inject Camel control headers camel-solr: Apache Camel: Camel-Solr: The SolrParam. and SolrField. Exchange header prefixes used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to inject Solr query parameters (server-side request forgery) and document fields org.apache.sshd/sshd-core: Apache MINA SSHD: Unauthorized command execution due to improper certificate validation org.apache.cxf/cxf:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;jetty-security: Eclipse Jetty: Authentication bypass via Digest authentication encoding collision jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections org.bouncycastle/bc-java: org.bouncycastle/bc-lts-java: Bouncy Castle for Java: Cryptographic signature bypass in RSA PKCS#1 verification vertx-core: Eclipse Vert.x: Information disclosure via improper handling of HTTP 30x redirects camel-jms: camel-sjms: camel-amqp: camel-mina: camel-netty: camel-netty-http: camel-vertx-http: camel-infinispan: camel-leveldb: camel-cassandraql: camel-consul: camel-sql: Apache Camel: Information disclosure via deserialization of untrusted data camel-aws2-sqs: Apache Camel: Camel-AWS2-SQS: Inbound message attributes are mapped into the Exchange without an inbound HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing a message sender to inject Camel control headers camel-nats: Apache Camel: Camel-NATS: Inbound NATS message headers are mapped into the Exchange without a configured HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing a client that can publish to the subject to inject Camel control headers camel-solr: Apache Camel: Camel-Solr: The SolrParam. and SolrField. Exchange header prefixes used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to inject Solr query parameters (server-side request forgery) and document fields org.apache.sshd/sshd-core: Apache MINA SSHD: Unauthorized command execution due to improper certificate validation org.apache.cxf/cxf:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:71675</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2203 — Apache Camel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203</guid>
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