<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 20:41:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-06314</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-06314</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-06314</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-06314</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-308597</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308597</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-308597</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308597</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42238</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42238</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application&amp;#39;s configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application&amp;#39;s configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42238</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr — Nginx-UI is Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4pvg-prr3-9cxr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Product:** nginx-ui
**Repository:** `0xJacky/nginx-ui` (branch: `dev`)
**Vulnerability Class:** Authentication Bypass → Arbitrary File Write → OS Command Injection
**Affected Component:** `POST /api/restore`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## 1. Vulnerability Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (`POST /api/restore`) that is **completely unauthenticated** during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application&amp;#39;s configuration file (`app.ini`) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored `app.ini`, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the `TestConfigCmd` setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically `root` in Docker deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 10-minute unauthenticated window resets on every process restart, making this exploitable not only on initial deployments but on any restart event (container restart, upgrade, health-check-triggered restart).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## 2. Root Cause Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2.1 The Restore Route Is Registered Without Authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backup.InitRouter` is called on the `root` group, which carries only `IPWhiteList()` middleware — no `AuthRequired()`: [1](#2-0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route definition: [2](#2-1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2.2 The `authIfInstalled` Guard Has a Time-Bounded Bypass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only authentication guard on the restore route is…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Product:** nginx-ui
**Repository:** `0xJacky/nginx-ui` (branch: `dev`)
**Vulnerability Class:** Authentication Bypass → Arbitrary File Write → OS Command Injection
**Affected Component:** `POST /api/restore`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## 1. Vulnerability Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (`POST /api/restore`) that is **completely unauthenticated** during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application&amp;#39;s configuration file (`app.ini`) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored `app.ini`, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the `TestConfigCmd` setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically `root` in Docker deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 10-minute unauthenticated window resets on every process restart, making this exploitable not only on initial deployments but on any restart event (container restart, upgrade, health-check-triggered restart).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## 2. Root Cause Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2.1 The Restore Route Is Registered Without Authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backup.InitRouter` is called on the `root` group, which carries only `IPWhiteList()` middleware — no `AuthRequired()`: [1](#2-0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route definition: [2](#2-1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2.2 The `authIfInstalled` Guard Has a Time-Bounded Bypass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The only authentication guard on the restore route is…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4pvg-prr3-9cxr</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1276 — nginx-ui: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1276</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in nginx-ui ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code mit Root-Rechten auszuführen, sich Administratorrechte zu verschaffen und die vollständige Kontrolle über das System zu erlangen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in nginx-ui ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code mit Root-Rechten auszuführen, sich Administratorrechte zu verschaffen und die vollständige Kontrolle über das System zu erlangen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1276</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
