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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 13:07:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-rawdog-CVE-2026-42208 — LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-rawdog-cve-2026-42208</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: rawdog&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: rawdog&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-rawdog-cve-2026-42208</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-337245</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337245</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-337245</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337245</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42208</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42208</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42208</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r75f-5x8p-qvmc — LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r75f-5x8p-qvmc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r75f-5x8p-qvmc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NCSC-2026-0137 — Kwetsbaarheden verholpen in LiteLLM door BerriAI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0137</link>
      <description>NCSC-2026-0137</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0137</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-391 — LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-391</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)
 
**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)
 
**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-391</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1288 — LiteLLM: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1288</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in LiteLLM ausnutzen, um einen SQL-Injection-Angriff durchzuführen und sich unbefugten Zugriff zu verschaffen oder um beliebigen Programmcode mit den Rechten des Dienstes auszuführen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in LiteLLM ausnutzen, um einen SQL-Injection-Angriff durchzuführen und sich unbefugten Zugriff zu verschaffen oder um beliebigen Programmcode mit den Rechten des Dienstes auszuführen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1288</guid>
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