https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:03:30 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-41579 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: runc, Alpaquita:25: runc, Alpaquita:stream: runc</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: runc, Alpaquita:25: runc, Alpaquita:stream: runc</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-41579 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0841 certfr-2026-avi-0841 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0841 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-aq74255 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: cadvisor</p> <p>Package cadvisor version 0.57.0-r1 fixes 2 vulnerabilities: ghsa-xjvp-4fhw-gc47, CVE-2026-41579</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: cadvisor</p> <p>Package cadvisor version 0.57.0-r1 fixes 2 vulnerabilities: ghsa-xjvp-4fhw-gc47, CVE-2026-41579</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-aq74255 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331675 EUVD-2026-331675 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331675 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41579 <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41579 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xjvp-4fhw-gc47 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/opencontainers/runc</p> <p>### Impact When setting up the container rootfs, `setupPtmx` and `setupDevSymlinks` call `os.Remove` and `os.Symlink` with a `filepath.Join` string which allow an image with `/dev` as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called `ptmx` on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory.</p> <p>Please note that this issue is not exploitable under Docker because [it creates a top-level `ro` layer that masks any malicious `/dev` symlink present in the container image](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/docker-v29.4.1/daemon/initlayer/setup_unix.go) (this is also done without mounting the lower layers so there is no opportunity for the malicious `/dev` symlink to trick it into resolving to some other path). Unfortunately, Podman and containerd&lt;sup&gt;&amp;dagger;&lt;/sup&gt; do not do this and so users using those higher-level runtimes with runc can be exploited via a malicious image.</p> <p>This issue mirrors a [somewhat similar issue in crun](https://github.com/containers/crun/security/advisories/GHSA-7vwr-4279-7gq5), which was also published recently.</p> <p>###### &amp;dagger; Actually, at the time the issue was analysed, [containerd had dead code that implemented this feature](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/v2.2.3/pkg/rootfs/init_linux.go) but the implementation contained several security issues that would arguably have made it more exploitable than in runc. Luckily, the code appears to have never been used (at l…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/opencontainers/runc</p> <p>### Impact When setting up the container rootfs, `setupPtmx` and `setupDevSymlinks` call `os.Remove` and `os.Symlink` with a `filepath.Join` string which allow an image with `/dev` as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called `ptmx` on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory.</p> <p>Please note that this issue is not exploitable under Docker because [it creates a top-level `ro` layer that masks any malicious `/dev` symlink present in the container image](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/docker-v29.4.1/daemon/initlayer/setup_unix.go) (this is also done without mounting the lower layers so there is no opportunity for the malicious `/dev` symlink to trick it into resolving to some other path). Unfortunately, Podman and containerd&lt;sup&gt;&amp;dagger;&lt;/sup&gt; do not do this and so users using those higher-level runtimes with runc can be exploited via a malicious image.</p> <p>This issue mirrors a [somewhat similar issue in crun](https://github.com/containers/crun/security/advisories/GHSA-7vwr-4279-7gq5), which was also published recently.</p> <p>###### &amp;dagger; Actually, at the time the issue was analysed, [containerd had dead code that implemented this feature](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/v2.2.3/pkg/rootfs/init_linux.go) but the implementation contained several security issues that would arguably have made it more exploitable than in runc. Luckily, the code appears to have never been used (at l…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xjvp-4fhw-gc47 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-41579 msrc_CVE-2026-41579 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-41579 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3154 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: runc, openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: runc, openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: runc, openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3: runc, openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: runc</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.(CVE-2026-41579)</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4: runc, openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: runc, openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: runc, openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3: runc, openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: runc</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.(CVE-2026-41579)</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-3154 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11301-1 <p>runc-1.4.3-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>runc-1.4.3-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11301-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22938-1 <p>Security update for runc</p> <p>Security update for runc</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22938-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-41579 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: runc-app, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: runc-app, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: runc-app, Ubuntu:25.10: runc, Ubuntu:25.10: runc-app and 4 more</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: runc-app, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: runc-app, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: runc, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: runc-app, Ubuntu:25.10: runc, Ubuntu:25.10: runc-app and 4 more</p> <p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions prior to 1.3.6, 1.4.0-rc.1, 1.4.0-rc.12, 1.5.0-rc.1, and 1.5.0-rc.1, when setting up the container rootfs, setupPtmx and setupDevSymlinks call os.Remove and os.Symlink with a filepath.Join string which allow an image with /dev as a symlink to trick runc into deleting files called ptmx on the host or creating a hardcoded set of symlinks with specific names and targets in an arbitrary pre-existing host directory. This issue is not exploitable under Docker, because Docker creates a top-level read-only layer that masks any malicious /dev symlink present in the container image — unlike some other Linux container tooling, whose higher-level runtimes built on runc remain exposed to exploitation via a malicious image. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.6, 1.4.3 and 1.5.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-41579