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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 11:10:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-09696</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09696</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-09696</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09696</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-41567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-41567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: docker, Alpaquita:25: docker, Alpaquita:stream: docker&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: docker, Alpaquita:25: docker, Alpaquita:stream: docker&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-41567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-AC15686 — Security fix for CVE-2026-41567 applied in: amazon-cloudwatch-agent 1.300070.0-r1, amazon-cloudwatch-agent 1.300071.0-r…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ac15686</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: amazon-cloudwatch-agent, CleanStart: prometheus-fips, CleanStart: rancher-agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-41567 affects multiple packages. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: amazon-cloudwatch-agent, CleanStart: prometheus-fips, CleanStart: rancher-agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-41567 affects multiple packages. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ac15686</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-365465</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365465</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-365465</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-365465</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r — Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x86f-5xw2-fm2r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/moby/moby/v2, Go: github.com/docker/docker, Go: github.com/moby/moby&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The executed binary runs with the daemon&amp;#39;s full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Conditions for exploitation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.
- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Not affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Standard `docker cp` usage is **not** affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to `docker cp` or the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API, for…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/moby/moby/v2, Go: github.com/docker/docker, Go: github.com/moby/moby&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The executed binary runs with the daemon&amp;#39;s full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Conditions for exploitation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary.
- The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Not affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Standard `docker cp` usage is **not** affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to `docker cp` or the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API, for…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x86f-5xw2-fm2r</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11075-1 — docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-18.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11075-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-18.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;docker-stable-24.0.9_ce-18.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11075-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:37387 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.22.0 security, enhancement &amp; bug fix update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:37387</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd local privilege escalation containerd: containerd has an integer overflow in User ID handling runc: runc can be tricked into creating empty files/directories on host noobaa-core: Excessive permissions of /etc could lead to escalation of privilege in the noobaa-core container go-git: argument injection via the URL field go-git: go-git clients vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted Git server replies golang.org/x/net/proxy: golang.org/x/net/http/httpproxy: HTTP Proxy bypass using IPv6 Zone IDs in golang.org/x/net golang.org/x/net/html: Quadratic parsing complexity in golang.org/x/net/html runc: opencontainers/selinux: container escape and denial of service due to arbitrary write gadgets and procfs write redirects github.com/moby/moby: Moby&amp;#39;s Firewalld reload removes bridge network isolation github.com/ulikunitz/xz: github.com/ulikunitz/xz leaks memory github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd: Memory exhaustion via CRI Attach implementation goroutine leaks github.com/sigstore/fulcio: Fulcio: Denial of Service via crafted OpenID Connect (OIDC) token fulcio: Fulcio: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via unanchored regex in MetaIssuer URL validation github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor denial of service github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Denial of Service due to excessive HTML parsing golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd local privilege escalation containerd: containerd has an integer overflow in User ID handling runc: runc can be tricked into creating empty files/directories on host noobaa-core: Excessive permissions of /etc could lead to escalation of privilege in the noobaa-core container go-git: argument injection via the URL field go-git: go-git clients vulnerable to DoS via maliciously crafted Git server replies golang.org/x/net/proxy: golang.org/x/net/http/httpproxy: HTTP Proxy bypass using IPv6 Zone IDs in golang.org/x/net golang.org/x/net/html: Quadratic parsing complexity in golang.org/x/net/html runc: opencontainers/selinux: container escape and denial of service due to arbitrary write gadgets and procfs write redirects github.com/moby/moby: Moby&amp;#39;s Firewalld reload removes bridge network isolation github.com/ulikunitz/xz: github.com/ulikunitz/xz leaks memory github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd: Memory exhaustion via CRI Attach implementation goroutine leaks github.com/sigstore/fulcio: Fulcio: Denial of Service via crafted OpenID Connect (OIDC) token fulcio: Fulcio: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via unanchored regex in MetaIssuer URL validation github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor denial of service github.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Denial of Service due to excessive HTML parsing golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:37387</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:22285-1 — Security update for docker</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22285-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for docker&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for docker&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22285-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-41567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:25.10: docker.io, Ubuntu:25.10: docker.io-app and 2 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: docker.io, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: docker.io-app, Ubuntu:25.10: docker.io, Ubuntu:25.10: docker.io-app and 2 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container&amp;#39;s filesystem rather than the host&amp;#39;s due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-41567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1584 — docker: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1584</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in docker ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode mit Administratorrechten auszuführen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen oder Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in docker ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode mit Administratorrechten auszuführen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen oder Daten zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1584</guid>
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