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EUVD-2026-293120

fkie_cve-2026-41488

LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.

GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r — langchain-openai: Image token counting SSRF protection can be bypassed via DNS rebinding

Affected: PyPI: langchain-openai

## Summary

`langchain-openai`'s `_url_to_size()` helper (used by `get_num_tokens_from_messages` for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.

The practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow's `Image.open()` to extract dimensions — the response content is never returned, logged, or otherwise exposed to the caller. An attacker cannot exfiltrate data from internal services through this path. A potential risk is blind probing (inferring whether an internal host/port is open based on timing or error behavior).

## Affected versions

- `langchain-openai` < 1.1.14

## Patched versions

- `langchain-openai` >= 1.1.14 (requires `langchain-core` >= 1.2.31)

## Affected code

**File:** `libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py` — `_url_to_size()`

The vulnerable pattern was a validate-then-fetch with separate DNS resolution:

```python validate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True) # ... separate network operation with independent DNS resolution ... response = httpx.get(image_source, timeout=timeout) ```

## Fix

The fix replaces the validate-then-fetch pattern with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (`SSRFSafeSyncTransport`…

PYSEC-2026-76

Affected: PyPI: langchain-openai

WID-SEC-W-2026-1275 — LangChain (openai, text-splitters): Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Offenlegung von Informationen und SSRF-Umgehung

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in LangChain ausnutzen, um SSRF-Schutzmaßnahmen zu umgehen und Informationen offenzulegen.