https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 22:50:31 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0698 certfr-2026-avi-0698 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0698 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mt51676 <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: py3-langchain</p> <p>Package py3-langchain version 1.2.14-r2 fixes 2 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-41481, ghsa-fv5p-p927-qmxr</p> <p><strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong></p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: py3-langchain</p> <p>Package py3-langchain version 1.2.14-r2 fixes 2 vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-41481, ghsa-fv5p-p927-qmxr</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-mt51676 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337254 EUVD-2026-337254 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337254 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41481 <p>LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.</p> <p>LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41481 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fv5p-p927-qmxr <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain-text-splitters</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url()` validated the initial URL using `validate_safe_url()` but then performed the fetch with `requests.get()` with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections.</p> <p>The response body is parsed and returned as `Document` objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue.</p> <p>## Affected versions</p> <p>- `langchain-text-splitters` &lt; 1.1.2</p> <p>## Patched versions</p> <p>- `langchain-text-splitters` &gt;= 1.1.2 (requires `langchain-core` &gt;= 1.2.31)</p> <p>## Affected code</p> <p>**File:** `libs/text-splitters/langchain_text_splitters/html.py` — `split_text_from_url()`</p> <p>The vulnerable pattern validated the URL once then fetched with redirects enabled:</p> <p>```python validate_safe_url(url, allow_private=False, allow_http=True) response = requests.get(url, timeout=timeout, **kwargs) ```</p> <p>## Attack scenario</p> <p>1. A developer passes external URLs to `split_text_from_url()`, relying on its built-in `validate_safe_ur…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain-text-splitters</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>`HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url()` validated the initial URL using `validate_safe_url()` but then performed the fetch with `requests.get()` with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections.</p> <p>The response body is parsed and returned as `Document` objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue.</p> <p>## Affected versions</p> <p>- `langchain-text-splitters` &lt; 1.1.2</p> <p>## Patched versions</p> <p>- `langchain-text-splitters` &gt;= 1.1.2 (requires `langchain-core` &gt;= 1.2.31)</p> <p>## Affected code</p> <p>**File:** `libs/text-splitters/langchain_text_splitters/html.py` — `split_text_from_url()`</p> <p>The vulnerable pattern validated the URL once then fetched with redirects enabled:</p> <p>```python validate_safe_url(url, allow_private=False, allow_http=True) response = requests.get(url, timeout=timeout, **kwargs) ```</p> <p>## Attack scenario</p> <p>1. A developer passes external URLs to `split_text_from_url()`, relying on its built-in `validate_safe_ur…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fv5p-p927-qmxr https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-77 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain-text-splitters</p> <p>LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langchain-text-splitters</p> <p>LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-77 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1275 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in LangChain ausnutzen, um SSRF-Schutzmaßnahmen zu umgehen und Informationen offenzulegen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in LangChain ausnutzen, um SSRF-Schutzmaßnahmen zu umgehen und Informationen offenzulegen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1275