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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 03:30:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292976</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292976</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292976</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292976</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41428</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41428</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.35.4, the authenticated middleware uses unanchored regular expressions to match public (no-auth) endpoint patterns against ctx.request.url. Since ctx.request.url in Koa includes the query string, an attacker can access any protected endpoint by appending a public endpoint path as a query parameter. For example, POST /api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status bypasses all authentication because the regex /api/system/status/ matches in the query string portion of the URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.35.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.35.4, the authenticated middleware uses unanchored regular expressions to match public (no-auth) endpoint patterns against ctx.request.url. Since ctx.request.url in Koa includes the query string, an attacker can access any protected endpoint by appending a public endpoint path as a query parameter. For example, POST /api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status bypasses all authentication because the regex /api/system/status/ matches in the query string portion of the URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.35.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41428</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf — Budibase: Authentication Bypass via Unanchored Regex in Public Endpoint Matcher — Unauthenticated Access to Protected E…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8783-3wgf-jggf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/backend-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `authenticated` middleware uses unanchored regular expressions to match public (no-auth) endpoint patterns against `ctx.request.url`. Since `ctx.request.url` in Koa includes the query string, an attacker can access any protected endpoint by appending a public endpoint path as a query parameter. For example, `POST /api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status` bypasses all authentication because the regex `/api/system/status/` matches in the query string portion of the URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 — Public endpoint patterns compiled without anchors**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/matchers.ts`, line 26:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
return { regex: new RegExp(route), method, route }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No `^` prefix, no `$` suffix. The regex matches anywhere in the test string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 — Regex tested against full URL including query string**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/matchers.ts`, line 32:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
const urlMatch = regex.test(ctx.request.url)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Koa&amp;#39;s `ctx.request.url` returns the full URL including query string (e.g., `/api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status`). The regex `/api/system/status` matches in the query string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 3 — publicEndpoint flag set to true**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/authenticated.ts`, lines 123-125:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
const found = matches(ctx, noAuthOptions)
if (found) {
  publicEndpoint = true
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 4 — Worker&amp;#39;s global auth check skipped**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/worker/src/api/index.ts`, lines 160-162:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
.us…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @budibase/backend-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `authenticated` middleware uses unanchored regular expressions to match public (no-auth) endpoint patterns against `ctx.request.url`. Since `ctx.request.url` in Koa includes the query string, an attacker can access any protected endpoint by appending a public endpoint path as a query parameter. For example, `POST /api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status` bypasses all authentication because the regex `/api/system/status/` matches in the query string portion of the URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 — Public endpoint patterns compiled without anchors**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/matchers.ts`, line 26:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
return { regex: new RegExp(route), method, route }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No `^` prefix, no `$` suffix. The regex matches anywhere in the test string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 — Regex tested against full URL including query string**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/matchers.ts`, line 32:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
const urlMatch = regex.test(ctx.request.url)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Koa&amp;#39;s `ctx.request.url` returns the full URL including query string (e.g., `/api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status`). The regex `/api/system/status` matches in the query string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 3 — publicEndpoint flag set to true**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/authenticated.ts`, lines 123-125:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
const found = matches(ctx, noAuthOptions)
if (found) {
  publicEndpoint = true
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 4 — Worker&amp;#39;s global auth check skipped**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`packages/worker/src/api/index.ts`, lines 160-162:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
.us…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8783-3wgf-jggf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1135 — Budibase: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Umgehen von Sicherheitsvorkehrungen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1135</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1135</guid>
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