https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:54:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0781 certfr-2026-avi-0781 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0781 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-362256 EUVD-2026-362256 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-362256 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41326 <p>Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.</p> <p>Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.29.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41326 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q49m-57vm-c8cc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers</p> <p>### Summary An oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs.</p> <p>### Details Here is the policy that covers CopyFile requests. ``` CopyFileRequest if { print(&#34;CopyFileRequest: input.path =&#34;, input.path) check_directory_traversal(input.path) some regex1 in policy_data.request_defaults.CopyFileRequest regex2 := replace(regex1, &#34;$(sfprefix)&#34;, policy_data.common.sfprefix) regex3 := replace(regex2, &#34;$(cpath)&#34;, policy_data.common.cpath) regex4 := replace(regex3, &#34;$(bundle-id)&#34;, &#34;[a-z0-9]{64}&#34;) print(&#34;CopyFileRequest: regex4 =&#34;, regex4) regex.match(regex4, input.path) print(&#34;CopyFileRequest: true&#34;) } ``` This checks that files are being copied to `policy_data.common.cpath`, which is typically set to `/run/kata-containers/shared/containers`. In other words, you&#39;re allowed to copy files to anywhere inside the shared dir.</p> <p>For reference, here is the CopyFile message. Note that none of the other fields are check in the policy. ``` message CopyFileRequest { // Path is the destination file in the guest. It must be absolute, // canonical and below /run. string path = 1; // FileSize is the expected file size, for security reasons write operations // are made in a temporary file, once it has t…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers</p> <p>### Summary An oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrate data from containers; even those running inside CVMs.</p> <p>### Details Here is the policy that covers CopyFile requests. ``` CopyFileRequest if { print(&#34;CopyFileRequest: input.path =&#34;, input.path) check_directory_traversal(input.path) some regex1 in policy_data.request_defaults.CopyFileRequest regex2 := replace(regex1, &#34;$(sfprefix)&#34;, policy_data.common.sfprefix) regex3 := replace(regex2, &#34;$(cpath)&#34;, policy_data.common.cpath) regex4 := replace(regex3, &#34;$(bundle-id)&#34;, &#34;[a-z0-9]{64}&#34;) print(&#34;CopyFileRequest: regex4 =&#34;, regex4) regex.match(regex4, input.path) print(&#34;CopyFileRequest: true&#34;) } ``` This checks that files are being copied to `policy_data.common.cpath`, which is typically set to `/run/kata-containers/shared/containers`. In other words, you&#39;re allowed to copy files to anywhere inside the shared dir.</p> <p>For reference, here is the CopyFile message. Note that none of the other fields are check in the policy. ``` message CopyFileRequest { // Path is the destination file in the guest. It must be absolute, // canonical and below /run. string path = 1; // FileSize is the expected file size, for security reasons write operations // are made in a temporary file, once it has t…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q49m-57vm-c8cc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:25200 <p>kata-containers: Arbitrary file write inside guest image via CopyFile policy kernel: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2-&gt;cb[] in ip4ip6_err()</p> <p>kata-containers: Arbitrary file write inside guest image via CopyFile policy kernel: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2-&gt;cb[] in ip4ip6_err()</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:25200