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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-325635</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-325635</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-325635</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-325635</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41235</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41235</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor is open source server administration software. Version 2.3.6 lets administrators configure `system.available_shells` as the approved shell list that customers may assign to FTP users. However, the server-side FTP account handlers do not enforce that whitelist when processing add or edit requests. As a result, an authenticated customer with shell delegation enabled can submit an arbitrary shell such as `/bin/bash` even when the panel UI only offers more restricted choices. In deployments that use the default `nssextrausers` integration, the attacker-controlled shell is then propagated into the system account database, leading to real host shell access. Version 2.3.7 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor is open source server administration software. Version 2.3.6 lets administrators configure `system.available_shells` as the approved shell list that customers may assign to FTP users. However, the server-side FTP account handlers do not enforce that whitelist when processing add or edit requests. As a result, an authenticated customer with shell delegation enabled can submit an arbitrary shell such as `/bin/bash` even when the panel UI only offers more restricted choices. In deployments that use the default `nssextrausers` integration, the attacker-controlled shell is then propagated into the system account database, leading to real host shell access. Version 2.3.7 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41235</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gcv3-5v9q-fmhh — Froxlor has an authorization bypass in FTP shell assignment via missing server-side `available_shells` enforcement</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcv3-5v9q-fmhh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: froxlor/froxlor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Froxlor 2.3.6 lets administrators configure `system.available_shells` as the approved shell list that customers may assign to FTP users. However, the server-side FTP account handlers do not enforce that whitelist when processing add or edit requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an authenticated customer with shell delegation enabled can submit an arbitrary shell such as `/bin/bash` even when the panel UI only offers more restricted choices. In deployments that use the default `nssextrausers` integration, the attacker-controlled shell is then propagated into the system account database, leading to real host shell access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The customer-facing FTP account page builds the shell selector from `system.available_shells`, which shows that the product intends the setting to act as the authorization boundary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// customer_ftp.php:138-149
$shells = [
    &amp;#39;/bin/false&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;/bin/false&amp;#39;
];
$availableshells = explode(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;, Settings::Get(&amp;#39;system.available_shells&amp;#39;));
if (is_array($availableshells) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !empty($availableshells)) {
    foreach ($availableshells as $shell) {
        $shells[trim($shell)] = trim($shell);
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The request handler forwards posted form data directly into the FTP API command implementation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// customer_ftp.php:170-172
if ($action == &amp;#39;edit&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; Request::post(&amp;#39;send&amp;#39;) == &amp;#39;send&amp;#39;) {
    $result = $log-&amp;gt;logAction(USR_ACTION, LOG_INFO, &amp;#34;edited ftp-account #&amp;#34; . $id);
    Commands::get()-&amp;gt;apiCall(&amp;#39;Ftps.update&amp;#39;, Request::postAll());
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: froxlor/froxlor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Froxlor 2.3.6 lets administrators configure `system.available_shells` as the approved shell list that customers may assign to FTP users. However, the server-side FTP account handlers do not enforce that whitelist when processing add or edit requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an authenticated customer with shell delegation enabled can submit an arbitrary shell such as `/bin/bash` even when the panel UI only offers more restricted choices. In deployments that use the default `nssextrausers` integration, the attacker-controlled shell is then propagated into the system account database, leading to real host shell access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The customer-facing FTP account page builds the shell selector from `system.available_shells`, which shows that the product intends the setting to act as the authorization boundary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// customer_ftp.php:138-149
$shells = [
    &amp;#39;/bin/false&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;/bin/false&amp;#39;
];
$availableshells = explode(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;, Settings::Get(&amp;#39;system.available_shells&amp;#39;));
if (is_array($availableshells) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !empty($availableshells)) {
    foreach ($availableshells as $shell) {
        $shells[trim($shell)] = trim($shell);
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The request handler forwards posted form data directly into the FTP API command implementation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// customer_ftp.php:170-172
if ($action == &amp;#39;edit&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; Request::post(&amp;#39;send&amp;#39;) == &amp;#39;send&amp;#39;) {
    $result = $log-&amp;gt;logAction(USR_ACTION, LOG_INFO, &amp;#34;edited ftp-account #&amp;#34; . $id);
    Commands::get()-&amp;gt;apiCall(&amp;#39;Ftps.update&amp;#39;, Request::postAll());
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcv3-5v9q-fmhh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1737 — Froxlor: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1737</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1737</guid>
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