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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:30:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-jupyterlab-CVE-2026-40934 — Jupyter Server's Authentication Cookies Remain Valid After Password Reset and Server Restart</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-40934</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: jupyterlab&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A persistent cookie secret vulnerability allows authenticated users to maintain indefinite access even after password changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cookie secret used to sign authentication cookies is stored in a permanent file (`~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret`) that is never automatically rotated or cleared, allowing stolen or compromised cookies to remain valid indefinitely regardless of password resets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Start a Jupyter server with password authentication: `jupyter server password`, `jupyter server`
- Log in with the password and capture the authentication cookie (e.g., just login with a browser).
- Change the password to revoke access: `jupyter server password`
- Restart the server
- Use the old stolen cookie =&amp;gt; remains valid and provides full authenticated access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- All jupyter-server deployments using password authentication where security incidents may occur
- Multi-user systems where one user&amp;#39;s compromised session should be revocable by administrators
- Shared or public-facing Jupyter servers where credential rotation is a security requirement
- Any deployment where password changes are expected to revoke existing sessions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server 2.18+&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
rm ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret
# Then restart the server
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: jupyterlab&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A persistent cookie secret vulnerability allows authenticated users to maintain indefinite access even after password changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cookie secret used to sign authentication cookies is stored in a permanent file (`~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret`) that is never automatically rotated or cleared, allowing stolen or compromised cookies to remain valid indefinitely regardless of password resets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Start a Jupyter server with password authentication: `jupyter server password`, `jupyter server`
- Log in with the password and capture the authentication cookie (e.g., just login with a browser).
- Change the password to revoke access: `jupyter server password`
- Restart the server
- Use the old stolen cookie =&amp;gt; remains valid and provides full authenticated access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- All jupyter-server deployments using password authentication where security incidents may occur
- Multi-user systems where one user&amp;#39;s compromised session should be revocable by administrators
- Shared or public-facing Jupyter servers where credential rotation is a security requirement
- Any deployment where password changes are expected to revoke existing sessions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server 2.18+&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
rm ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret
# Then restart the server
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-40934</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-GG76429 — Security fixes in tensorflow-gpu-jupyter 2.21.0-r5</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-gg76429</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: tensorflow-gpu-jupyter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package tensorflow-gpu-jupyter version 2.21.0-r5 fixes 28 vulnerabilities: ghsa-rch3-82jr-f9w9, ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg, ghsa-37w4-hwhx-4rc4, ghsa-mf9v-mfxr-j63j, ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f...&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: tensorflow-gpu-jupyter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Package tensorflow-gpu-jupyter version 2.21.0-r5 fixes 28 vulnerabilities: ghsa-rch3-82jr-f9w9, ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg, ghsa-37w4-hwhx-4rc4, ghsa-mf9v-mfxr-j63j, ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f...&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-gg76429</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-308951</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308951</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-308951</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308951</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40934</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40934</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40934</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f — Jupyter Server's Authentication Cookies Remain Valid After Password Reset and Server Restart</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A persistent cookie secret vulnerability allows authenticated users to maintain indefinite access even after password changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cookie secret used to sign authentication cookies is stored in a permanent file (`~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret`) that is never automatically rotated or cleared, allowing stolen or compromised cookies to remain valid indefinitely regardless of password resets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Start a Jupyter server with password authentication: `jupyter server password`, `jupyter server`
- Log in with the password and capture the authentication cookie (e.g., just login with a browser).
- Change the password to revoke access: `jupyter server password`
- Restart the server
- Use the old stolen cookie =&amp;gt; remains valid and provides full authenticated access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- All jupyter-server deployments using password authentication where security incidents may occur
- Multi-user systems where one user&amp;#39;s compromised session should be revocable by administrators
- Shared or public-facing Jupyter servers where credential rotation is a security requirement
- Any deployment where password changes are expected to revoke existing sessions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server 2.18+&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
rm ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret
# Then restart the server
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A persistent cookie secret vulnerability allows authenticated users to maintain indefinite access even after password changes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cookie secret used to sign authentication cookies is stored in a permanent file (`~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret`) that is never automatically rotated or cleared, allowing stolen or compromised cookies to remain valid indefinitely regardless of password resets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Start a Jupyter server with password authentication: `jupyter server password`, `jupyter server`
- Log in with the password and capture the authentication cookie (e.g., just login with a browser).
- Change the password to revoke access: `jupyter server password`
- Restart the server
- Use the old stolen cookie =&amp;gt; remains valid and provides full authenticated access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- All jupyter-server deployments using password authentication where security incidents may occur
- Multi-user systems where one user&amp;#39;s compromised session should be revocable by administrators
- Shared or public-facing Jupyter servers where credential rotation is a security requirement
- Any deployment where password changes are expected to revoke existing sessions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server 2.18+&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
rm ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret
# Then restart the server
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4080 — python-jupyter-server security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The backend for Jupyter web applications&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In jupyter_server versions through 2.17.0, the next query parameter in the login flow is insufficiently validated in `LoginFormHandler._redirect_safe()`, which allows redirects to arbitrary external domains via values such as `///example.com`. An attacker can use a crafted login URL to redirect users to a malicious site and facilitate phishing attacks. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2025-61669)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named &amp;amp;quot;test&amp;amp;quot;, the API permits access to a sibling directory named &amp;amp;quot;testtest&amp;amp;quot; through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named &amp;amp;quot;user1&amp;amp;quot; could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder nam…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4: python-jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The backend for Jupyter web applications&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In jupyter_server versions through 2.17.0, the next query parameter in the login flow is insufficiently validated in `LoginFormHandler._redirect_safe()`, which allows redirects to arbitrary external domains via values such as `///example.com`. An attacker can use a crafted login URL to redirect users to a malicious site and facilitate phishing attacks. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.(CVE-2025-61669)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named &amp;amp;quot;test&amp;amp;quot;, the API permits access to a sibling directory named &amp;amp;quot;testtest&amp;amp;quot; through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named &amp;amp;quot;user1&amp;amp;quot; could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Version 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder nam…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4080</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10710-1 — python311-jupyter-server-2.18.1-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10710-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;python311-jupyter-server-2.18.1-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;python311-jupyter-server-2.18.1-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10710-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-69</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-69</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-69</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-40934</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40934</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:25.10: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:25.10: jupyter-server, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the secret used to sign authentication cookies is persisted to a static file at ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret and is never rotated when a user changes their password. After a password reset and server restart, any previously issued authentication cookie remains cryptographically valid because the signing key has not changed. An attacker who has captured a session cookie through any means retains full authenticated access to the server regardless of subsequent password changes. This affects deployments using password-based authentication, particularly shared or public-facing servers where credential rotation is expected to revoke existing sessions. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40934</guid>
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