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Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-HA54107 — Security fixes in tekton-chains 0.25.2-r1

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: tekton-chains

Package tekton-chains version 0.25.2-r1 fixes 23 vulnerabilities: ghsa-gcjh-h69q-9w9g, ghsa-pmwq-pjrm-6p5r, CVE-2026-49478, CVE-2026-48702, CVE-2026-49834...

EUVD-2026-320117

fkie_cve-2026-40924

Tekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Starting in version 1.0.0 and prior to versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1, the HTTP resolver's FetchHttpResource function calls io.ReadAll(resp.Body) with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated pkg/resolution/resolver/http and the current pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http implementations. Versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1 fix the issue.

GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74 — Tekton Pipelines: HTTP Resolver Unbounded Response Body Read Enables Denial of Service via Memory Exhaustion

Affected: Go: github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

## Summary

The HTTP resolver's `FetchHttpResource` function calls `io.ReadAll(resp.Body)` with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated `pkg/resolution/resolver/http` and the current `pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http` implementations.

## Details

`pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:279–307`:

```go func FetchHttpResource(ctx context.Context, params map[string]string, kubeclient kubernetes.Interface, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) (framework.ResolvedResource, error) {

httpClient, err := makeHttpClient(ctx) // default timeout: 1 minute // ... resp, err := httpClient.Do(req) // ... defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ← no size limit if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } // ... } ```

`makeHttpClient` sets `http.Client{Timeout: timeout}` where `timeout` defaults to 1 minute and is configurable v…