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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 08:23:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-airflow-2026-40861 — Apache Airflow: Arbitrary File Read via Log Symlink following in FileTaskHandler</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-airflow-2026-40861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: airflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: airflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-airflow-2026-40861</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-324042</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-324042</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-324042</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-324042</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40861</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40861</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-89cj-xrpx-j79m — Apache Airflow has a Link Following issue</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-89cj-xrpx-j79m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: apache-airflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: apache-airflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-89cj-xrpx-j79m</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-181</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-181</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: apache-airflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: apache-airflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Dag author could either (a) create a symlink under their task&amp;#39;s log directory pointing to an arbitrary file readable by the API server process (read-path attack — e.g. `/etc/passwd` or `airflow.cfg`) or (b) supply a `task_id` containing `..` sequences accepted by the Task SDK&amp;#39;s `KEY_REGEX` (write-path attack), and in both cases the FileTaskHandler resolves the log path outside the configured `base_log_folder`, leaking or overwriting arbitrary files. Only affects deployments where the worker log folder is shared with the API server. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deploy the worker and API server with separate log volumes so that worker-controlled paths cannot reach the API server&amp;#39;s filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-181</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1761 — Apache Airflow: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1761</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Airflow ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Airflow ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1761</guid>
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