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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 07:48:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-290892</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290892</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-290892</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290892</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40395</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40395</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12 allows a &amp;#34;workspace overflow&amp;#34; denial of service (daemon panic) for shared VCL. The headerplus.write_req0() function from vmod_headerplus updates the underlying req0, which is normally the original read-only request from which req is derived (readable and writable from VCL). This is useful in the active VCL, after amending req, to prepare a refined req0 before switching to a different VCL with the return (vcl(&amp;lt;label&amp;gt;)) action. This is for example how the Varnish Controller operates shared VCL deployments. If the amended req contained too many header fields for req0, this would have resulted in a workspace overflow that would in turn trigger a panic and crash the Varnish Enterprise server. This could be used as a Denial of Service attack vector by malicious clients.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12 allows a &amp;#34;workspace overflow&amp;#34; denial of service (daemon panic) for shared VCL. The headerplus.write_req0() function from vmod_headerplus updates the underlying req0, which is normally the original read-only request from which req is derived (readable and writable from VCL). This is useful in the active VCL, after amending req, to prepare a refined req0 before switching to a different VCL with the return (vcl(&amp;lt;label&amp;gt;)) action. This is for example how the Varnish Controller operates shared VCL deployments. If the amended req contained too many header fields for req0, this would have resulted in a workspace overflow that would in turn trigger a panic and crash the Varnish Enterprise server. This could be used as a Denial of Service attack vector by malicious clients.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40395</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-59jh-85v4-gxrf</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59jh-85v4-gxrf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12 allows a &amp;#34;workspace overflow&amp;#34; denial of service (daemon panic) for shared VCL. The headerplus.write_req0() function from vmod_headerplus updates the underlying req0, which is normally the original read-only request from which req is derived (readable and writable from VCL). This is useful in the active VCL, after amending req, to prepare a refined req0 before switching to a different VCL with the return (vcl(&amp;lt;label&amp;gt;)) action. This is for example how the Varnish Controller operates shared VCL deployments. If the amended req contained too many header fields for req0, this would have resulted in a workspace overflow that would in turn trigger a panic and crash the Varnish Enterprise server. This could be used as a Denial of Service attack vector by malicious clients.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12 allows a &amp;#34;workspace overflow&amp;#34; denial of service (daemon panic) for shared VCL. The headerplus.write_req0() function from vmod_headerplus updates the underlying req0, which is normally the original read-only request from which req is derived (readable and writable from VCL). This is useful in the active VCL, after amending req, to prepare a refined req0 before switching to a different VCL with the return (vcl(&amp;lt;label&amp;gt;)) action. This is for example how the Varnish Controller operates shared VCL deployments. If the amended req contained too many header fields for req0, this would have resulted in a workspace overflow that would in turn trigger a panic and crash the Varnish Enterprise server. This could be used as a Denial of Service attack vector by malicious clients.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-59jh-85v4-gxrf</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-40395</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40395</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:25.10: varnish, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: varnish&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12 allows a &amp;#34;workspace overflow&amp;#34; denial of service (daemon panic) for shared VCL. The headerplus.write_req0() function from vmod_headerplus updates the underlying req0, which is normally the original read-only request from which req is derived (readable and writable from VCL). This is useful in the active VCL, after amending req, to prepare a refined req0 before switching to a different VCL with the return (vcl(&amp;lt;label&amp;gt;)) action. This is for example how the Varnish Controller operates shared VCL deployments. If the amended req contained too many header fields for req0, this would have resulted in a workspace overflow that would in turn trigger a panic and crash the Varnish Enterprise server. This could be used as a Denial of Service attack vector by malicious clients.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: varnish, Ubuntu:25.10: varnish, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: varnish&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Varnish Enterprise before 6.0.16r12 allows a &amp;#34;workspace overflow&amp;#34; denial of service (daemon panic) for shared VCL. The headerplus.write_req0() function from vmod_headerplus updates the underlying req0, which is normally the original read-only request from which req is derived (readable and writable from VCL). This is useful in the active VCL, after amending req, to prepare a refined req0 before switching to a different VCL with the return (vcl(&amp;lt;label&amp;gt;)) action. This is for example how the Varnish Controller operates shared VCL deployments. If the amended req contained too many header fields for req0, this would have resulted in a workspace overflow that would in turn trigger a panic and crash the Varnish Enterprise server. This could be used as a Denial of Service attack vector by malicious clients.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40395</guid>
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