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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 13:05:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-15295</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15295</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-15295</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-15295</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309174</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309174</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309174</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309174</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40194</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpseclib is a PHP secure communications library. Starting in 0.1.1 and prior to 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28, phpseclib\Net\SSH2::get_binary_packet() uses PHP&amp;#39;s != operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. != on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses memcmp(), which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpseclib is a PHP secure communications library. Starting in 0.1.1 and prior to 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28, phpseclib\Net\SSH2::get_binary_packet() uses PHP&amp;#39;s != operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. != on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses memcmp(), which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40194</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx — phpseclib has a variable-time HMAC comparison in SSH2::get_binary_packet() using != instead of hash_equals()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r854-jrxh-36qx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpseclib/phpseclib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`phpseclib\Net\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP&amp;#39;s `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH&amp;#39;s disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`
- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`
- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410
- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)
- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`
- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)
- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($this-&amp;gt;hmac_check instanceof Hash) {
    $reconstructed = !$this-&amp;gt;hmac_check_etm ?
        pack(&amp;#39;Na*&amp;#39;, $packet-&amp;gt;packet_length, $packet-&amp;gt;plain) :
        substr($packet-&amp;gt;raw, 0, -$this-&amp;gt;hmac_size);
    if (($this-&amp;gt;hmac_check-&amp;gt;getHash() &amp;amp; &amp;#34;\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF&amp;#34;) == &amp;#39;umac&amp;#39;) {
        $this-&amp;gt;hmac_chec…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpseclib/phpseclib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`phpseclib\Net\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP&amp;#39;s `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH&amp;#39;s disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`
- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`
- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410
- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)
- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`
- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)
- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($this-&amp;gt;hmac_check instanceof Hash) {
    $reconstructed = !$this-&amp;gt;hmac_check_etm ?
        pack(&amp;#39;Na*&amp;#39;, $packet-&amp;gt;packet_length, $packet-&amp;gt;plain) :
        substr($packet-&amp;gt;raw, 0, -$this-&amp;gt;hmac_size);
    if (($this-&amp;gt;hmac_check-&amp;gt;getHash() &amp;amp; &amp;#34;\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF&amp;#34;) == &amp;#39;umac&amp;#39;) {
        $this-&amp;gt;hmac_chec…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r854-jrxh-36qx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-40194</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: php-phpseclib3, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: php-phpseclib3 and 8 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;phpseclib is a PHP secure communications library. Starting in 0.1.1 and prior to 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28, phpseclib\Net\SSH2::get_binary_packet() uses PHP&amp;#39;s != operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. != on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses memcmp(), which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: php-phpseclib, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: php-phpseclib3, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: phpseclib, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: php-phpseclib3 and 8 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;phpseclib is a PHP secure communications library. Starting in 0.1.1 and prior to 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28, phpseclib\Net\SSH2::get_binary_packet() uses PHP&amp;#39;s != operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. != on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses memcmp(), which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.51, 2.0.53, and 1.0.28.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-40194</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1931 — Cacti: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1931</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Cacti ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Cacti ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, und um Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1931</guid>
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