https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:45:38 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09731 bdu:2026-09731 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09731 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333486 EUVD-2026-333486 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-333486 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40047 <p>Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (&#39;Argument Injection&#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.</p> <p>The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List&lt;String&gt;) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation allowed CLI-argument injection and directory traversal in the arguments passed to the external tool. The invocation uses the list-based form of ProcessBuilder, so a shell does not interpret the argument values; OS command injection through shell metacharacters was not possible, and the metacharac…</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (&#39;Argument Injection&#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.</p> <p>The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List&lt;String&gt;) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation allowed CLI-argument injection and directory traversal in the arguments passed to the external tool. The invocation uses the list-based form of ProcessBuilder, so a shell does not interpret the argument values; OS command injection through shell metacharacters was not possible, and the metacharac…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40047 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rpv3-6645-2vqc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-docling</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (&#39;Argument Injection&#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.</p> <p>The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List&lt;String&gt;) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation allowed CLI-argument injection and directory traversal in the arguments passed to the external tool. The invocation uses the list-based form of ProcessBuilder, so a shell does not interpret the argument values; OS command injection through shell metacharacters was not possible, and the metacharac…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.apache.camel:camel-docling</p> <p>Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (&#39;Argument Injection&#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.</p> <p>The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List&lt;String&gt;) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation allowed CLI-argument injection and directory traversal in the arguments passed to the external tool. The invocation uses the list-based form of ProcessBuilder, so a shell does not interpret the argument values; OS command injection through shell metacharacters was not possible, and the metacharac…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rpv3-6645-2vqc https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apache Camel ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, serverseitige Request-Forgery durchzuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Daten zu manipulieren.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2203