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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 07:16:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-281152</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281152</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-281152</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281152</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-35459</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35459</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. In 0.5.0b3.dev96 and earlier, pyLoad has a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The fix for CVE-2026-33992 added IP validation to BaseDownloader.download() that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with FOLLOWLOCATION=1 and MAXREDIRS=10, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter. An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. In 0.5.0b3.dev96 and earlier, pyLoad has a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The fix for CVE-2026-33992 added IP validation to BaseDownloader.download() that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with FOLLOWLOCATION=1 and MAXREDIRS=10, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter. An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35459</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg — pyLoad: SSRF filter bypass via HTTP redirect in BaseDownloader (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33992)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7gvf-3w72-p2pg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pyload-ng&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2026-33992 (GHSA-m74m-f7cr-432x) added IP validation to `BaseDownloader.download()` that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with `FOLLOWLOCATION=1` and `MAXREDIRS=10`, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSRF check at `src/pyload/plugins/base/downloader.py:335-341` validates only the initial URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dl_hostname = urllib.parse.urlparse(dl_url).hostname
    if is_ip_address(dl_hostname) and not is_global_address(dl_hostname):
        self.fail(...)
    else:
        for ip in host_to_ip(dl_hostname):
            if not is_global_address(ip):
                self.fail(...)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the check passes, `_download()` is called. pycurl is configured at `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:114-115` to follow redirects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)
    self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No `CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS` restriction is set anywhere in HTTPRequest. Redirect targets bypass the SSRF filter entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Redirect server (attacker-controlled):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        def do_GET(self):
            self.send_response(302)
            self.send_header(&amp;#34;Location&amp;#34;,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pyload-ng&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2026-33992 (GHSA-m74m-f7cr-432x) added IP validation to `BaseDownloader.download()` that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with `FOLLOWLOCATION=1` and `MAXREDIRS=10`, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSRF check at `src/pyload/plugins/base/downloader.py:335-341` validates only the initial URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dl_hostname = urllib.parse.urlparse(dl_url).hostname
    if is_ip_address(dl_hostname) and not is_global_address(dl_hostname):
        self.fail(...)
    else:
        for ip in host_to_ip(dl_hostname):
            if not is_global_address(ip):
                self.fail(...)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the check passes, `_download()` is called. pycurl is configured at `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:114-115` to follow redirects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)
    self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No `CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS` restriction is set anywhere in HTTPRequest. Redirect targets bypass the SSRF filter entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Redirect server (attacker-controlled):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        def do_GET(self):
            self.send_response(302)
            self.send_header(&amp;#34;Location&amp;#34;,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7gvf-3w72-p2pg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-495 — pyLoad: SSRF filter bypass via HTTP redirect in BaseDownloader (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33992)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-495</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pyload-ng&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2026-33992 (GHSA-m74m-f7cr-432x) added IP validation to `BaseDownloader.download()` that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with `FOLLOWLOCATION=1` and `MAXREDIRS=10`, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSRF check at `src/pyload/plugins/base/downloader.py:335-341` validates only the initial URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dl_hostname = urllib.parse.urlparse(dl_url).hostname
    if is_ip_address(dl_hostname) and not is_global_address(dl_hostname):
        self.fail(...)
    else:
        for ip in host_to_ip(dl_hostname):
            if not is_global_address(ip):
                self.fail(...)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the check passes, `_download()` is called. pycurl is configured at `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:114-115` to follow redirects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)
    self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No `CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS` restriction is set anywhere in HTTPRequest. Redirect targets bypass the SSRF filter entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Redirect server (attacker-controlled):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        def do_GET(self):
            self.send_response(302)
            self.send_header(&amp;#34;Location&amp;#34;,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pyload-ng&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2026-33992 (GHSA-m74m-f7cr-432x) added IP validation to `BaseDownloader.download()` that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with `FOLLOWLOCATION=1` and `MAXREDIRS=10`, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSRF check at `src/pyload/plugins/base/downloader.py:335-341` validates only the initial URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dl_hostname = urllib.parse.urlparse(dl_url).hostname
    if is_ip_address(dl_hostname) and not is_global_address(dl_hostname):
        self.fail(...)
    else:
        for ip in host_to_ip(dl_hostname):
            if not is_global_address(ip):
                self.fail(...)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After the check passes, `_download()` is called. pycurl is configured at `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:114-115` to follow redirects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)
    self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No `CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS` restriction is set anywhere in HTTPRequest. Redirect targets bypass the SSRF filter entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Redirect server (attacker-controlled):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        def do_GET(self):
            self.send_response(302)
            self.send_header(&amp;#34;Location&amp;#34;,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-495</guid>
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