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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 19:46:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-07730</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07730</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-07730</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07730</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-mailcatcher-CVE-2026-34830 — Rack::Sendfile header-based X-Accel-Mapping regex injection enables unauthorized X-Accel-Redirect</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2026-34830</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mailcatcher&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` interpolates the value of the `X-Accel-Mapping` request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for `X-Accel-Redirect`. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply `X-Accel-Mapping` to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated `X-Accel-Redirect` response header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments using `Rack::Sendfile` with `x-accel-redirect`, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
mapping.split(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;).map(&amp;amp;:strip).each do |m|
  internal, external = m.split(&amp;#39;=&amp;#39;, 2).map(&amp;amp;:strip)
  new_path = path.sub(/\A#{internal}/i, external)
  return new_path unless path == new_path
end
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, `internal` comes from the `HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING` request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as `.*` or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
X-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;causes the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mappin…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mailcatcher&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` interpolates the value of the `X-Accel-Mapping` request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for `X-Accel-Redirect`. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply `X-Accel-Mapping` to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated `X-Accel-Redirect` response header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments using `Rack::Sendfile` with `x-accel-redirect`, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
mapping.split(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;).map(&amp;amp;:strip).each do |m|
  internal, external = m.split(&amp;#39;=&amp;#39;, 2).map(&amp;amp;:strip)
  new_path = path.sub(/\A#{internal}/i, external)
  return new_path unless path == new_path
end
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, `internal` comes from the `HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING` request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as `.*` or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
X-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;causes the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mappin…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2026-34830</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-280042</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280042</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-280042</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280042</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34830</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34830</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header. In deployments using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header. In deployments using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34830</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qv7j-4883-hwh7 — Rack::Sendfile header-based X-Accel-Mapping regex injection enables unauthorized X-Accel-Redirect</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qv7j-4883-hwh7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` interpolates the value of the `X-Accel-Mapping` request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for `X-Accel-Redirect`. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply `X-Accel-Mapping` to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated `X-Accel-Redirect` response header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments using `Rack::Sendfile` with `x-accel-redirect`, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
mapping.split(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;).map(&amp;amp;:strip).each do |m|
  internal, external = m.split(&amp;#39;=&amp;#39;, 2).map(&amp;amp;:strip)
  new_path = path.sub(/\A#{internal}/i, external)
  return new_path unless path == new_path
end
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, `internal` comes from the `HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING` request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as `.*` or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
X-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;causes the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mappin…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` interpolates the value of the `X-Accel-Mapping` request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for `X-Accel-Redirect`. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply `X-Accel-Mapping` to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated `X-Accel-Redirect` response header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments using `Rack::Sendfile` with `x-accel-redirect`, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
mapping.split(&amp;#39;,&amp;#39;).map(&amp;amp;:strip).each do |m|
  internal, external = m.split(&amp;#39;=&amp;#39;, 2).map(&amp;amp;:strip)
  new_path = path.sub(/\A#{internal}/i, external)
  return new_path unless path == new_path
end
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, `internal` comes from the `HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING` request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as `.*` or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```http
X-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txt
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;causes the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mappin…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qv7j-4883-hwh7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10508-1 — ruby4.0-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.23-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10508-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ruby4.0-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.23-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ruby4.0-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.23-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10508-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23321-1 — Security update for rmt-server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23321-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for rmt-server&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for rmt-server&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23321-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-34830</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-34830</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:25.10: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header. In deployments using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:25.10: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header. In deployments using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-34830</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1687 — IBM License Metric Tool: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1687</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM License Metric Tool ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM License Metric Tool ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1687</guid>
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