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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:09:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-07729</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07729</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-07729</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07729</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-mailcatcher-CVE-2026-34829 — Rack's multipart parsing without Content-Length header allows unbounded chunked file uploads</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2026-34829</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mailcatcher&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` only wraps the request body in a `BoundedIO` when `CONTENT_LENGTH` is present. When a `multipart/form-data` request is sent without a `Content-Length` header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse` applies `BoundedIO` only when `content_length` is not `nil`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
io = BoundedIO.new(io, content_length) if content_length
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `CONTENT_LENGTH` is absent, the parser reads the multipart body until EOF without a global byte limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although Rack enforces `BUFFERED_UPLOAD_BYTESIZE_LIMIT` for retained non-file parts, file uploads are handled differently. When a multipart part includes a filename, the body is streamed to a `Tempfile`, and the retained-size accounting is not applied to that file content. As a result, file parts are not subject to the same upload size bound.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can exploit this by sending a chunked `multipart/form-data` request containing a file part and continuously streaming data without declaring a `Content-Length…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mailcatcher&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` only wraps the request body in a `BoundedIO` when `CONTENT_LENGTH` is present. When a `multipart/form-data` request is sent without a `Content-Length` header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse` applies `BoundedIO` only when `content_length` is not `nil`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
io = BoundedIO.new(io, content_length) if content_length
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `CONTENT_LENGTH` is absent, the parser reads the multipart body until EOF without a global byte limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although Rack enforces `BUFFERED_UPLOAD_BYTESIZE_LIMIT` for retained non-file parts, file uploads are handled differently. When a multipart part includes a filename, the body is streamed to a `Tempfile`, and the retained-size accounting is not applied to that file content. As a result, file parts are not subject to the same upload size bound.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can exploit this by sending a chunked `multipart/form-data` request containing a file part and continuously streaming data without declaring a `Content-Length…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2026-34829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-337301</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337301</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-337301</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337301</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34829</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34829</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Multipart::Parser only wraps the request body in a BoundedIO when CONTENT_LENGTH is present. When a multipart/form-data request is sent without a Content-Length header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit. For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space. This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Multipart::Parser only wraps the request body in a BoundedIO when CONTENT_LENGTH is present. When a multipart/form-data request is sent without a Content-Length header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit. For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space. This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8vqr-qjwx-82mw — Rack's multipart parsing without Content-Length header allows unbounded chunked file uploads</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8vqr-qjwx-82mw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` only wraps the request body in a `BoundedIO` when `CONTENT_LENGTH` is present. When a `multipart/form-data` request is sent without a `Content-Length` header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse` applies `BoundedIO` only when `content_length` is not `nil`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
io = BoundedIO.new(io, content_length) if content_length
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `CONTENT_LENGTH` is absent, the parser reads the multipart body until EOF without a global byte limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although Rack enforces `BUFFERED_UPLOAD_BYTESIZE_LIMIT` for retained non-file parts, file uploads are handled differently. When a multipart part includes a filename, the body is streamed to a `Tempfile`, and the retained-size accounting is not applied to that file content. As a result, file parts are not subject to the same upload size bound.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can exploit this by sending a chunked `multipart/form-data` request containing a file part and continuously streaming data without declaring a `Content-Length…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` only wraps the request body in a `BoundedIO` when `CONTENT_LENGTH` is present. When a `multipart/form-data` request is sent without a `Content-Length` header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse` applies `BoundedIO` only when `content_length` is not `nil`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
io = BoundedIO.new(io, content_length) if content_length
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `CONTENT_LENGTH` is absent, the parser reads the multipart body until EOF without a global byte limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although Rack enforces `BUFFERED_UPLOAD_BYTESIZE_LIMIT` for retained non-file parts, file uploads are handled differently. When a multipart part includes a filename, the body is streamed to a `Tempfile`, and the retained-size accounting is not applied to that file content. As a result, file parts are not subject to the same upload size bound.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can exploit this by sending a chunked `multipart/form-data` request containing a file part and continuously streaming data without declaring a `Content-Length…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8vqr-qjwx-82mw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10508-1 — ruby4.0-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.23-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10508-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ruby4.0-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.23-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ruby4.0-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.23-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10508-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23321-1 — Security update for rmt-server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23321-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for rmt-server&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for rmt-server&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:23321-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-34829</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-34829</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:25.10: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Multipart::Parser only wraps the request body in a BoundedIO when CONTENT_LENGTH is present. When a multipart/form-data request is sent without a Content-Length header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit. For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space. This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:25.10: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6, Rack::Multipart::Parser only wraps the request body in a BoundedIO when CONTENT_LENGTH is present. When a multipart/form-data request is sent without a Content-Length header, such as with HTTP chunked transfer encoding, multipart parsing continues until end-of-stream with no total size limit. For file parts, the uploaded body is written directly to a temporary file on disk rather than being constrained by the buffered in-memory upload limit. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore stream an arbitrarily large multipart file upload and consume unbounded disk space. This results in a denial of service condition for Rack applications that accept multipart form data. This issue has been patched in versions 2.2.23, 3.1.21, and 3.2.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-34829</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1687 — IBM License Metric Tool: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1687</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM License Metric Tool ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM License Metric Tool ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1687</guid>
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