https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 13 Oct 2026 05:47:29 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07538 bdu:2026-07538 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07538 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290150 EUVD-2026-290150 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290150 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34178 <p>In Canonical LXD before 6.8, the backup import path validates project restrictions against backup/index.yaml in the supplied tar archive but creates the instance from backup/container/backup.yaml, a separate file in the same archive that is never checked against project restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker with instance-creation permission in a restricted project can craft a backup archive where backup.yaml carries restricted settings such as security.privileged=true or raw.lxc directives, bypassing all project restriction enforcement and allowing full host compromise.</p> <p>In Canonical LXD before 6.8, the backup import path validates project restrictions against backup/index.yaml in the supplied tar archive but creates the instance from backup/container/backup.yaml, a separate file in the same archive that is never checked against project restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker with instance-creation permission in a restricted project can craft a backup archive where backup.yaml carries restricted settings such as security.privileged=true or raw.lxc directives, bypassing all project restriction enforcement and allowing full host compromise.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34178 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q96j-3fmm-7fv4 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/canonical/lxd</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>LXD instance backup import validates project restrictions against `backup/index.yaml` embedded in the tar archive, but creates the actual instance from `backup/container/backup.yaml` extracted to the storage volume. Because these are separate, independently attacker-controlled files within the same tar archive, an attacker with instance-creation rights in a restricted project can craft a backup where `index.yaml` contains clean configuration (passing all restriction checks) while `backup.yaml` contains `security.privileged=true`, `raw.lxc` host filesystem mounts, and restricted device types. The instance is created from the unchecked `backup.yaml`, bypassing all project restriction enforcement.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>LXD projects support a `restricted=true` mode that enforces security boundaries on what instances within the project can do. These restrictions include blocking `security.privileged=true` containers, `raw.lxc` / `raw.apparmor` overrides, and device passthrough (GPU, USB, PCI, unix-char). These restrictions are intended to prevent container escape vectors regardless of user privilege level within the project.</p> <p>The backup import path has two distinct configuration sources within a single tar archive:</p> <p>1. `backup/index.yaml` - A quick-access metadata file read by `backup.GetInfo()` at `backup/backup_info.go:68`. This is the config checked against project restrictions. 2. `backup/container/backup.yaml` - The full instance configuration extracted to the storage vol…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/canonical/lxd</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>LXD instance backup import validates project restrictions against `backup/index.yaml` embedded in the tar archive, but creates the actual instance from `backup/container/backup.yaml` extracted to the storage volume. Because these are separate, independently attacker-controlled files within the same tar archive, an attacker with instance-creation rights in a restricted project can craft a backup where `index.yaml` contains clean configuration (passing all restriction checks) while `backup.yaml` contains `security.privileged=true`, `raw.lxc` host filesystem mounts, and restricted device types. The instance is created from the unchecked `backup.yaml`, bypassing all project restriction enforcement.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>LXD projects support a `restricted=true` mode that enforces security boundaries on what instances within the project can do. These restrictions include blocking `security.privileged=true` containers, `raw.lxc` / `raw.apparmor` overrides, and device passthrough (GPU, USB, PCI, unix-char). These restrictions are intended to prevent container escape vectors regardless of user privilege level within the project.</p> <p>The backup import path has two distinct configuration sources within a single tar archive:</p> <p>1. `backup/index.yaml` - A quick-access metadata file read by `backup.GetInfo()` at `backup/backup_info.go:68`. This is the config checked against project restrictions. 2. `backup/container/backup.yaml` - The full instance configuration extracted to the storage vol…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q96j-3fmm-7fv4 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-34178 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: incus, Ubuntu:25.10: incus, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: incus</p> <p>In Canonical LXD before 6.8, the backup import path validates project restrictions against backup/index.yaml in the supplied tar archive but creates the instance from backup/container/backup.yaml, a separate file in the same archive that is never checked against project restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker with instance-creation permission in a restricted project can craft a backup archive where backup.yaml carries restricted settings such as security.privileged=true or raw.lxc directives, bypassing all project restriction enforcement and allowing full host compromise.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: incus, Ubuntu:25.10: incus, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: incus</p> <p>In Canonical LXD before 6.8, the backup import path validates project restrictions against backup/index.yaml in the supplied tar archive but creates the instance from backup/container/backup.yaml, a separate file in the same archive that is never checked against project restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker with instance-creation permission in a restricted project can craft a backup archive where backup.yaml carries restricted settings such as security.privileged=true or raw.lxc directives, bypassing all project restriction enforcement and allowing full host compromise.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-34178