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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 04:43:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277897</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277897</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277897</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277897</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33744</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33744</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.37, the `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. Version 1.4.37 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.37, the `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. Version 1.4.37 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33744</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jfjg-vc52-wqvf — BentoML has Dockerfile Command Injection via system_packages in bentofile.yaml</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfjg-vc52-wqvf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: bentoml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:85-89` — `.format(packages=&amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(packages))` into shell command
- `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_debian.j2:13` — `{{ __options__system_packages | join(&amp;#39; &amp;#39;) }}`
- `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:174` — No validation on `system_packages`
- All distro install commands in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/__init__.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All versions supporting `docker.system_packages` in `bentofile.yaml`, confirmed on 1.4.36.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Create a project directory with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**service.py:**
```python
import bentoml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@bentoml.service
class MyService:
    @bentoml.api
    def predict(self) -&amp;gt; str:
        return &amp;#34;hello&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**bentofile.yaml:**
```yaml
service: &amp;#34;service:MyService&amp;#34;
docker:
  system_packages:
    - &amp;#34;curl &amp;amp;&amp;amp; id &amp;gt; /tmp/bentoml-pwned #&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Run:
```bash
bentoml build
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. Examine the generated Dockerfile at `~/bentoml/bentos/my_service/&amp;lt;tag&amp;gt;/env/docker/Dockerfile`. Line 41 will contain:
```dockerfile
R…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: bentoml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:85-89` — `.format(packages=&amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(packages))` into shell command
- `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_debian.j2:13` — `{{ __options__system_packages | join(&amp;#39; &amp;#39;) }}`
- `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:174` — No validation on `system_packages`
- All distro install commands in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/__init__.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All versions supporting `docker.system_packages` in `bentofile.yaml`, confirmed on 1.4.36.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Create a project directory with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**service.py:**
```python
import bentoml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@bentoml.service
class MyService:
    @bentoml.api
    def predict(self) -&amp;gt; str:
        return &amp;#34;hello&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**bentofile.yaml:**
```yaml
service: &amp;#34;service:MyService&amp;#34;
docker:
  system_packages:
    - &amp;#34;curl &amp;amp;&amp;amp; id &amp;gt; /tmp/bentoml-pwned #&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Run:
```bash
bentoml build
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. Examine the generated Dockerfile at `~/bentoml/bentos/my_service/&amp;lt;tag&amp;gt;/env/docker/Dockerfile`. Line 41 will contain:
```dockerfile
R…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfjg-vc52-wqvf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-157</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-157</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: bentoml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.37, the `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. Version 1.4.37 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: bentoml&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.37, the `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. Version 1.4.37 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-157</guid>
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