https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 21:55:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276775 EUVD-2026-276775 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276775 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33139 <p>PySpector is a static analysis security testing (SAST) Framework engineered for modern Python development workflows. PySpector versions 0.1.6 and prior are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The validate_plugin_code() function in plugin_system.py, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the internal resolve_name() helper only handles ast.Name and ast.Attribute node types, returning None for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via getattr() (such as getattr(os, &#39;system&#39;)) the outer call&#39;s func node is of type ast.Call, causing resolve_name() to return None, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user&#39;s machine when loaded. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.</p> <p>PySpector is a static analysis security testing (SAST) Framework engineered for modern Python development workflows. PySpector versions 0.1.6 and prior are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The validate_plugin_code() function in plugin_system.py, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the internal resolve_name() helper only handles ast.Name and ast.Attribute node types, returning None for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via getattr() (such as getattr(os, &#39;system&#39;)) the outer call&#39;s func node is of type ast.Call, causing resolve_name() to return None, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user&#39;s machine when loaded. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33139 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v3xv-8vc3-h2m6 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyspector</p> <p>### Summary PySpector versions `&lt;= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, &#39;system&#39;)`) the outer call&#39;s func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user&#39;s machine when loaded.</p> <p>### Impact An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user&#39;s local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable: - Full read/write access to the local filesystem - Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...) -…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyspector</p> <p>### Summary PySpector versions `&lt;= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, &#39;system&#39;)`) the outer call&#39;s func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user&#39;s machine when loaded.</p> <p>### Impact An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user&#39;s local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable: - Full read/write access to the local filesystem - Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...) -…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v3xv-8vc3-h2m6 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3030 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyspector</p> <p>### Summary PySpector versions `&lt;= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, &#39;system&#39;)`) the outer call&#39;s func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user&#39;s machine when loaded.</p> <p>### Impact An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user&#39;s local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable: - Full read/write access to the local filesystem - Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...) -…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyspector</p> <p>### Summary PySpector versions `&lt;= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, &#39;system&#39;)`) the outer call&#39;s func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user&#39;s machine when loaded.</p> <p>### Impact An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user&#39;s local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable: - Full read/write access to the local filesystem - Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...) -…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3030