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bdu:2026-05929

BELL-CVE-2026-33056

Affected: Alpaquita:23: rust, Alpaquita:25: rust, Alpaquita:stream: rust

certfr-2026-avi-0386 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits Microsoft. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoqu…

certfr-2026-avi-0386

EUVD-2026-276630

fkie_cve-2026-33056

tar-rs is a tar archive reading/writing library for Rust. In versions 0.4.44 and below, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because fs::metadata() follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root. This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

GHSA-j4xf-2g29-59ph — tar-rs `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks

Affected: crates.io: tar

## Summary

When unpacking a tar archive, the `tar` crate's `unpack_dir` function uses `fs::metadata()` to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because `fs::metadata()` follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply `chmod` to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.

## Reproducer

A malicious tarball contains two entries: (1) a symlink `foo` pointing to an arbitrary external directory, and (2) a directory entry `foo/.` (or just `foo`). When unpacked, `create_dir("foo")` fails with `EEXIST` because the symlink is already on disk. The `fs::metadata()` check then follows the symlink, sees a directory at the target, and allows processing to continue. The directory entry's mode bits are then applied via `chmod`, which also follows the symlink — modifying the permissions of the external target directory.

## Fix

The fix is very simple, we now use `fs::symlink_metadata()` in `unpack_dir`, so symlinks are detected and rejected rather than followed.

## Credit

This issue was reported by @xokdvium - thank you!

msrc_CVE-2026-33056 — tar-rs: unpack_in can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks

msrc_CVE-2026-33056

RUSTSEC-2026-0067 — `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks

Affected: crates.io: tar

In versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs, when unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's `unpack_dir` function uses [`fs::metadata()`][fs-metadata] to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because `fs::metadata()` follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

[fs-metadata]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/fs/fn.metadata.html

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-33056

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: rustc, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: cargo, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rustc, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: cargo, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rustc, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: cargo, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rust-tar, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rustc, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rustc-1.76, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rustc-1.77 and 43 more