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CLEANSTART-2026-SJ56797 — Security fix for CVE-2026-32887 applied in: jitsucom-jitsu 2.11.0-r3

Affected: CleanStart: jitsucom-jitsu

Security vulnerability affects the jitsucom-jitsu package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.

EUVD-2026-277346

fkie_cve-2026-32887

Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage`-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, `auth()` from `@clerk/nextjs/server` returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.

GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g — Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC

Affected: npm: effect

## Versions

- `effect`: 3.19.15 - `@effect/rpc`: 0.72.1 - `@effect/platform`: 0.94.2 - Node.js: v22.20.0 - Vercel runtime with Fluid compute - Next.js: 16 (App Router) - `@clerk/nextjs`: 6.x

## Root cause

Effect's `MixedScheduler` batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a **single** microtask or timer callback. The `AsyncLocalStorage` context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — **not** the request that owns the fiber being resumed.

### Detailed mechanism

#### 1. Scheduler batching (`effect/src/Scheduler.ts`, `MixedScheduler`)

```typescript // MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled private starve(depth = 0) { if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) { setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0) // timer queue } else { Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue } }

// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call private starveInternal(depth: number) { const tasks = this.tasks.buckets this.tasks.buckets = [] for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) { for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) { toRun[i]() // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context } } // ... } ```

`scheduleTask` only calls `starve()` when `running` is `false`. Subsequent tasks accumulate in `this.tasks` until `starveInternal` drains them all. The `Promise.then()` (or `setTimeout`…

WID-SEC-W-2026-3046 — IBM Concert: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Concert ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuführen, um einen SQL-Injection Angriff durchzuführen und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.