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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 08:28:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-275723</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275723</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-275723</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275723</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-32112</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32112</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ha-mcp is a Home Assistant MCP Server. Prior to 7.0.0, the ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator&amp;#39;s browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (ha-mcp-oauth), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ha-mcp is a Home Assistant MCP Server. Prior to 7.0.0, the ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator&amp;#39;s browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (ha-mcp-oauth), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pf93-j98v-25pv — ha-mcp has XSS via Unescaped HTML in OAuth Consent Form</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pf93-j98v-25pv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ha-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator&amp;#39;s browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (`ha-mcp-oauth`), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Unescaped f-string rendering**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`consent_form.py` builds HTML using Python f-strings. No call to `html.escape()` exists anywhere in the file. The following values are rendered unescaped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `client_name` / `client_id` — in HTML element context (lines 299, 303)
- `client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `state` — in HTML attribute context (lines 310–312), where a `&amp;#34;` character breaks out of `value=&amp;#34;&amp;#34;`
- `error_message`, `error`, `error_description` — in error display paths (lines 36–40, 496–497)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can register a client with a malicious `client_name` via the `/register` (DCR) endpoint, which accepts `client_name` without sanitization. If the server operator then visits a crafted authorization URL for that client, the payload executes in their browser.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Open Dynamic Client Registration**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DCR is enabled by default with no initial access token required. This is intentional: Claude.ai and ChatGPT must self-register on first use, which is the standard MCP OAuth flow (RFC 7591). Requiring a pre-shared token would break those integration…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ha-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator&amp;#39;s browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (`ha-mcp-oauth`), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Unescaped f-string rendering**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`consent_form.py` builds HTML using Python f-strings. No call to `html.escape()` exists anywhere in the file. The following values are rendered unescaped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `client_name` / `client_id` — in HTML element context (lines 299, 303)
- `client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `state` — in HTML attribute context (lines 310–312), where a `&amp;#34;` character breaks out of `value=&amp;#34;&amp;#34;`
- `error_message`, `error`, `error_description` — in error display paths (lines 36–40, 496–497)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can register a client with a malicious `client_name` via the `/register` (DCR) endpoint, which accepts `client_name` without sanitization. If the server operator then visits a crafted authorization URL for that client, the payload executes in their browser.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Open Dynamic Client Registration**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DCR is enabled by default with no initial access token required. This is intentional: Claude.ai and ChatGPT must self-register on first use, which is the standard MCP OAuth flow (RFC 7591). Requiring a pre-shared token would break those integration…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pf93-j98v-25pv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2508 — ha-mcp has XSS via Unescaped HTML in OAuth Consent Form</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2508</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ha-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator&amp;#39;s browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (`ha-mcp-oauth`), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Unescaped f-string rendering**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`consent_form.py` builds HTML using Python f-strings. No call to `html.escape()` exists anywhere in the file. The following values are rendered unescaped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `client_name` / `client_id` — in HTML element context (lines 299, 303)
- `client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `state` — in HTML attribute context (lines 310–312), where a `&amp;#34;` character breaks out of `value=&amp;#34;&amp;#34;`
- `error_message`, `error`, `error_description` — in error display paths (lines 36–40, 496–497)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can register a client with a malicious `client_name` via the `/register` (DCR) endpoint, which accepts `client_name` without sanitization. If the server operator then visits a crafted authorization URL for that client, the payload executes in their browser.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Open Dynamic Client Registration**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DCR is enabled by default with no initial access token required. This is intentional: Claude.ai and ChatGPT must self-register on first use, which is the standard MCP OAuth flow (RFC 7591). Requiring a pre-shared token would break those integration…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ha-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ha-mcp OAuth consent form renders user-controlled parameters via Python f-strings with no HTML escaping. An attacker who can reach the OAuth endpoint and convince the server operator to follow a crafted authorization URL could execute JavaScript in the operator&amp;#39;s browser. This affects only users running the beta OAuth mode (`ha-mcp-oauth`), which is not part of the standard setup and requires explicit configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Unescaped f-string rendering**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`consent_form.py` builds HTML using Python f-strings. No call to `html.escape()` exists anywhere in the file. The following values are rendered unescaped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `client_name` / `client_id` — in HTML element context (lines 299, 303)
- `client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `state` — in HTML attribute context (lines 310–312), where a `&amp;#34;` character breaks out of `value=&amp;#34;&amp;#34;`
- `error_message`, `error`, `error_description` — in error display paths (lines 36–40, 496–497)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can register a client with a malicious `client_name` via the `/register` (DCR) endpoint, which accepts `client_name` without sanitization. If the server operator then visits a crafted authorization URL for that client, the payload executes in their browser.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Open Dynamic Client Registration**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DCR is enabled by default with no initial access token required. This is intentional: Claude.ai and ChatGPT must self-register on first use, which is the standard MCP OAuth flow (RFC 7591). Requiring a pre-shared token would break those integration…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2508</guid>
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