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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:43:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-31707</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-31707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-31707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0831 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0831</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0831</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0831</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-347772</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347772</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-347772</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347772</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-31707</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-31707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
               resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
               resp-&amp;gt;ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz is __u32 and resp-&amp;gt;ngroups is __s32.  Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry-&amp;gt;msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-&amp;gt;ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
               resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
               resp-&amp;gt;ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz is __u32 and resp-&amp;gt;ngroups is __s32.  Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry-&amp;gt;msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-&amp;gt;ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-31707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5ww2-xm4x-3hm3</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5ww2-xm4x-3hm3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
               resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
               resp-&amp;gt;ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz is __u32 and resp-&amp;gt;ngroups is __s32.  Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry-&amp;gt;msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-&amp;gt;ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
               resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;
  KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
      msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
               resp-&amp;gt;ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz is __u32 and resp-&amp;gt;ngroups is __s32.  Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry-&amp;gt;msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-&amp;gt;ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5ww2-xm4x-3hm3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-31707 — ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-31707</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-31707</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-31707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10793-1 — kernel-devel-7.0.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10793-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10793-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-31707</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-31707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 191 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:   KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:       msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;   KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:       msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +                resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;   KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:       msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +                resp-&amp;gt;ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz is __u32 and resp-&amp;gt;ngroups is __s32.  Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry-&amp;gt;msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-&amp;gt;ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the respo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 191 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic.  Three cases can overflow:   KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:       msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;   KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:       msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +                resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz;   KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:       msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +                resp-&amp;gt;ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz is __u32 and resp-&amp;gt;ngroups is __s32.  Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply.  A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry-&amp;gt;msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp-&amp;gt;payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext-&amp;gt;ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the respo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-31707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1346 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1346</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Root-Rechte zu erlangen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder Auswirkungen unbestimmter Art zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Root-Rechte zu erlangen, um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen oder Auswirkungen unbestimmter Art zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1346</guid>
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