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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:55:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-31614</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-31614</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-31614</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0548 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0548</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0548</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0548</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-327030</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327030</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-327030</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327030</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-31614</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-31614</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp()
later reads ea-&amp;gt;ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea-&amp;gt;ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen.  Isn&amp;#39;t pointer math fun?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earlier check (u8 *)ea &amp;gt; end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this mess all up by using ea-&amp;gt;ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An &amp;#34;untrusted&amp;#34; server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp()
later reads ea-&amp;gt;ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea-&amp;gt;ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen.  Isn&amp;#39;t pointer math fun?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earlier check (u8 *)ea &amp;gt; end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this mess all up by using ea-&amp;gt;ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An &amp;#34;untrusted&amp;#34; server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-31614</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p37w-xhv5-6c8j</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p37w-xhv5-6c8j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp()
later reads ea-&amp;gt;ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea-&amp;gt;ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen.  Isn&amp;#39;t pointer math fun?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earlier check (u8 *)ea &amp;gt; end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this mess all up by using ea-&amp;gt;ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An &amp;#34;untrusted&amp;#34; server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp()
later reads ea-&amp;gt;ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea-&amp;gt;ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen.  Isn&amp;#39;t pointer math fun?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earlier check (u8 *)ea &amp;gt; end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this mess all up by using ea-&amp;gt;ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An &amp;#34;untrusted&amp;#34; server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p37w-xhv5-6c8j</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:10703-1 — kernel-devel-7.0.3-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10703-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.3-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.0.3-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:10703-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:22043-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22043-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22043-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-31614</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-31614</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp() later reads ea-&amp;gt;ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea-&amp;gt;ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen.  Isn&amp;#39;t pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea &amp;gt; end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea-&amp;gt;ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An &amp;#34;untrusted&amp;#34; server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0.  The strncmp() later reads ea-&amp;gt;ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea-&amp;gt;ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen.  Isn&amp;#39;t pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea &amp;gt; end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea-&amp;gt;ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An &amp;#34;untrusted&amp;#34; server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-31614</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1279 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1279</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, welche zu einem Denial-of-Service-Zustand, einer Rechteausweitung, der Ausführung von Code oder einer Speicherbeschädigung führen könnten.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, welche zu einem Denial-of-Service-Zustand, einer Rechteausweitung, der Ausführung von Code oder einer Speicherbeschädigung führen könnten.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1279</guid>
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