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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 08:36:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28472 — OpenClaw's gateway connect could skip device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Deployment Guidance&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.1`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.2`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Device-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @simecek for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Deployment Guidance&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.1`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.2`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Device-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @simecek for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28472</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>cnvd-2026-13595</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-13595</link>
      <description>cnvd-2026-13595</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-13595</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-274974</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-274974</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-274974</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-274974</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-28472</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-28472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain a vulnerability in the gateway WebSocket connect handshake in which it allows skipping device identity checks when auth.token is present but not validated. Attackers can connect to the gateway without providing device identity or pairing by exploiting the presence check instead of validation, potentially gaining operator access in vulnerable deployments.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain a vulnerability in the gateway WebSocket connect handshake in which it allows skipping device identity checks when auth.token is present but not validated. Attackers can connect to the gateway without providing device identity or pairing by exploiting the presence check instead of validation, potentially gaining operator access in vulnerable deployments.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-28472</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rv39-79c4-7459 — OpenClaw's gateway connect could skip device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rv39-79c4-7459</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Deployment Guidance&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.1`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.2`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Device-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @simecek for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Deployment Guidance&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.1`
- Fixed: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.2`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Device-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @simecek for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rv39-79c4-7459</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-0424 — OpenClaw: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere, nicht näher bezeichnete Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann diese Schwachstellen in OpenClaw ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, sich erhöhte Berechtigungen zu verschaffen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder andere, nicht näher bezeichnete Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0424</guid>
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