<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 19:57:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-276734</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276734</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-276734</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276734</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-27953</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27953</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body. By injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar&amp;#39;s canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body. By injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar&amp;#39;s canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27953</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f964-whrq-44h8 — ormar Pydantic Validation Bypass via __pk_only__ and __excluded__ Kwargs Injection in Model Constructor</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f964-whrq-44h8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ormar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Pydantic validation bypass in `ormar`&amp;#39;s model constructor allows any unauthenticated user to skip **all** field validation — type checks, constraints, `@field_validator`/`@model_validator` decorators, choices enforcement, and required-field checks — by injecting `&amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true` into a JSON request body. The unvalidated data is subsequently persisted to the database. This affects the **canonical usage pattern** recommended in ormar&amp;#39;s official documentation and examples.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary `__excluded__` parameter injection uses the same design pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields during construction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause:** `NewBaseModel.__init__` ([`ormar/models/newbasemodel.py`, line 128](https://github.com/collerek/ormar/blob/master/ormar/models/newbasemodel.py#L128)) pops `__pk_only__` directly from user-supplied `**kwargs` before any validation occurs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# ormar/models/newbasemodel.py, lines 128-142
pk_only = kwargs.pop(&amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;, False)      # ← extracted from user kwargs
object.__setattr__(self, &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;, pk_only)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;new_kwargs, through_tmp_dict = self._process_kwargs(kwargs)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if not pk_only:
    # Normal path: full Pydantic validation
    new_kwargs = self.serialize_nested_models_json_fields(new_kwargs)
    self.__pydantic_validator__.validate_python(
        new_kwargs, self_instance=self
    )
else:
    # Bypass path: NO validation at all
    fields_set = {self.ormar_config.pkname}
    values = new_kwargs
    obj…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ormar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Pydantic validation bypass in `ormar`&amp;#39;s model constructor allows any unauthenticated user to skip **all** field validation — type checks, constraints, `@field_validator`/`@model_validator` decorators, choices enforcement, and required-field checks — by injecting `&amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true` into a JSON request body. The unvalidated data is subsequently persisted to the database. This affects the **canonical usage pattern** recommended in ormar&amp;#39;s official documentation and examples.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary `__excluded__` parameter injection uses the same design pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields during construction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause:** `NewBaseModel.__init__` ([`ormar/models/newbasemodel.py`, line 128](https://github.com/collerek/ormar/blob/master/ormar/models/newbasemodel.py#L128)) pops `__pk_only__` directly from user-supplied `**kwargs` before any validation occurs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# ormar/models/newbasemodel.py, lines 128-142
pk_only = kwargs.pop(&amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;, False)      # ← extracted from user kwargs
object.__setattr__(self, &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;, pk_only)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;new_kwargs, through_tmp_dict = self._process_kwargs(kwargs)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if not pk_only:
    # Normal path: full Pydantic validation
    new_kwargs = self.serialize_nested_models_json_fields(new_kwargs)
    self.__pydantic_validator__.validate_python(
        new_kwargs, self_instance=self
    )
else:
    # Bypass path: NO validation at all
    fields_set = {self.ormar_config.pkname}
    values = new_kwargs
    obj…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f964-whrq-44h8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2247</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2247</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ormar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body. By injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar&amp;#39;s canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ormar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body. By injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar&amp;#39;s canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2247</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-27953</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-27953</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ormar, Ubuntu:25.10: ormar, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ormar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body. By injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar&amp;#39;s canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ormar, Ubuntu:25.10: ormar, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ormar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ormar is a async mini ORM for Python. Versions 0.23.0 and below are vulnerable to Pydantic validation bypass through the model constructor, allowing any unauthenticated user to skip all field validation by injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body. By injecting &amp;#34;__pk_only__&amp;#34;: true into a JSON request body, an unauthenticated attacker can skip all field validation and persist unvalidated data directly to the database. A secondary __excluded__ parameter injection uses the same pattern to selectively nullify arbitrary model fields (e.g., email or role) during construction. This affects ormar&amp;#39;s canonical FastAPI integration pattern recommended in its official documentation, enabling privilege escalation, data integrity violations, and business logic bypass in any application using ormar.Model directly as a request body parameter. This issue has been fixed in version 0.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-27953</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
