https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 17:44:49 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-uf69839 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: n8n</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the n8n package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> CleanStart: n8n</p> <p>Security vulnerability affects the n8n package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-uf69839 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-270695 EUVD-2026-270695 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-270695 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27795 <p>LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019). Users should upgrade to `@langchain/community` 1.1.18, which validates every redirect hop by disabling automatic redirects and re-validating `Location` targets before following them. In this version, automatic redirects are disabled (`redirect: &#34;manual&#34;`), each 3xx `Location` is resolved and validated with `validateSafeUrl()` before the next request, and a maximum redirect limit prevents infinite loops.</p> <p>LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019). Users should upgrade to `@langchain/community` 1.1.18, which validates every redirect hop by disabling automatic redirects and re-validating `Location` targets before following them. In this version, automatic redirects are disabled (`redirect: &#34;manual&#34;`), each 3xx `Location` is resolved and validated with `validateSafeUrl()` before the next request, and a maximum redirect limit prevents infinite loops.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27795 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mphv-75cg-56wg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @langchain/community</p> <p>## Summary A redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019).</p> <p>## Affected Component - Package: `@langchain/community` - Component: `RecursiveUrlLoader` - Configuration: `preventOutside` (default: `true`) is insufficient to prevent this bypass when redirects are followed automatically.</p> <p>## Description `RecursiveUrlLoader` is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. The existing SSRF mitigation validates the initial URL before fetching, but it does not re-validate when the request follows redirects. Because fetch follows redirects by default, an attacker can supply a public URL that passes validation and then redirects to a private network address, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoint.</p> <p>This constitutes a “check‑then‑act” gap in the request lifecycle: the safety check occurs before the redirect chain is resolved, and the final destination is never validated.</p> <p>## Impact If an attacker can influence content on a page being crawled (e.g., user‑generated content, untrusted external pages), they can cause the crawler to: - Fetch cloud instance metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure), potentially exposing credentials…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @langchain/community</p> <p>## Summary A redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint without revalidation. This is a bypass of the SSRF protections introduced in 1.1.14 (CVE-2026-26019).</p> <p>## Affected Component - Package: `@langchain/community` - Component: `RecursiveUrlLoader` - Configuration: `preventOutside` (default: `true`) is insufficient to prevent this bypass when redirects are followed automatically.</p> <p>## Description `RecursiveUrlLoader` is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. The existing SSRF mitigation validates the initial URL before fetching, but it does not re-validate when the request follows redirects. Because fetch follows redirects by default, an attacker can supply a public URL that passes validation and then redirects to a private network address, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoint.</p> <p>This constitutes a “check‑then‑act” gap in the request lifecycle: the safety check occurs before the redirect chain is resolved, and the final destination is never validated.</p> <p>## Impact If an attacker can influence content on a page being crawled (e.g., user‑generated content, untrusted external pages), they can cause the crawler to: - Fetch cloud instance metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure), potentially exposing credentials…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mphv-75cg-56wg