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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 06:12:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-273769</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273769</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-273769</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273769</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-27587</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27587</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, Caddy&amp;#39;s HTTP `path` request matcher is intended to be case-insensitive, but when the match pattern contains percent-escape sequences (`%xx`) it compares against the request&amp;#39;s escaped path without lowercasing. An attacker can bypass path-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the request path. Version 2.11.1 contains a fix for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, Caddy&amp;#39;s HTTP `path` request matcher is intended to be case-insensitive, but when the match pattern contains percent-escape sequences (`%xx`) it compares against the request&amp;#39;s escaped path without lowercasing. An attacker can bypass path-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the request path. Version 2.11.1 contains a fix for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27587</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g7pc-pc7g-h8jh — Caddy: MatchPath %xx (escaped-path) branch skips case normalization, enabling path-based route/auth bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g7pc-pc7g-h8jh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Caddy&amp;#39;s HTTP `path` request matcher is intended to be case-insensitive, but when the match pattern contains percent-escape sequences (`%xx`) it compares against the request&amp;#39;s escaped path without lowercasing. An attacker can bypass path-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the request path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In Caddy `v2.10.2`, `MatchPath` is explicitly designed to be case-insensitive and lowercases match patterns during provisioning:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go`: rationale captured in the `MatchPath` comment.
- `MatchPath.Provision` lowercases configured patterns via `strings.ToLower`.
- `MatchPath.MatchWithError` lowercases the request path for the normal matching path: `reqPath := strings.ToLower(r.URL.Path)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But when a match pattern contains a percent sign (`%`), `MatchPath.MatchWithError` switches to &amp;#34;escaped space&amp;#34; matching and builds the comparison string from `r.URL.EscapedPath()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `reqPathForPattern := CleanPath(r.URL.EscapedPath(), mergeSlashes)`
- If it doesn&amp;#39;t match, it `continue`s (skipping the remaining matching logic for that pattern).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `r.URL.EscapedPath()` is not lowercased, case differences in the request path can cause the escaped-space match to fail even though `MatchPath` is meant to be case-insensitive. For example, with a pattern of `/admin%2Fpanel`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Requesting `/admin%2Fpanel` matches and can be denied as intended.
- Requesting `/ADMIN%2Fpanel` does not match and falls thro…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Caddy&amp;#39;s HTTP `path` request matcher is intended to be case-insensitive, but when the match pattern contains percent-escape sequences (`%xx`) it compares against the request&amp;#39;s escaped path without lowercasing. An attacker can bypass path-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the request path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In Caddy `v2.10.2`, `MatchPath` is explicitly designed to be case-insensitive and lowercases match patterns during provisioning:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go`: rationale captured in the `MatchPath` comment.
- `MatchPath.Provision` lowercases configured patterns via `strings.ToLower`.
- `MatchPath.MatchWithError` lowercases the request path for the normal matching path: `reqPath := strings.ToLower(r.URL.Path)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But when a match pattern contains a percent sign (`%`), `MatchPath.MatchWithError` switches to &amp;#34;escaped space&amp;#34; matching and builds the comparison string from `r.URL.EscapedPath()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `reqPathForPattern := CleanPath(r.URL.EscapedPath(), mergeSlashes)`
- If it doesn&amp;#39;t match, it `continue`s (skipping the remaining matching logic for that pattern).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `r.URL.EscapedPath()` is not lowercased, case differences in the request path can cause the escaped-space match to fail even though `MatchPath` is meant to be case-insensitive. For example, with a pattern of `/admin%2Fpanel`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Requesting `/admin%2Fpanel` matches and can be denied as intended.
- Requesting `/ADMIN%2Fpanel` does not match and falls thro…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g7pc-pc7g-h8jh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-27587</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-27587</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: caddy, Ubuntu:25.10: caddy, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, Caddy&amp;#39;s HTTP `path` request matcher is intended to be case-insensitive, but when the match pattern contains percent-escape sequences (`%xx`) it compares against the request&amp;#39;s escaped path without lowercasing. An attacker can bypass path-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the request path. Version 2.11.1 contains a fix for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: caddy, Ubuntu:25.10: caddy, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, Caddy&amp;#39;s HTTP `path` request matcher is intended to be case-insensitive, but when the match pattern contains percent-escape sequences (`%xx`) it compares against the request&amp;#39;s escaped path without lowercasing. An attacker can bypass path-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the request path. Version 2.11.1 contains a fix for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-27587</guid>
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