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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 09:42:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-273586</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273586</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-273586</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273586</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-27586</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27586</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, two swallowed errors in `ClientAuthentication.provision()` cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary. Any deployment using `trusted_ca_cert_file` or `trusted_ca_certs_pem_files` for mTLS will silently degrade to accepting any system-trusted client certificate if the CA file becomes unavailable. This can happen due to a typo in the path, file rotation, corruption, or permission changes. The server gives no indication that mTLS is misconfigured. Version 2.11.1 fixes the vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, two swallowed errors in `ClientAuthentication.provision()` cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary. Any deployment using `trusted_ca_cert_file` or `trusted_ca_certs_pem_files` for mTLS will silently degrade to accepting any system-trusted client certificate if the CA file becomes unavailable. This can happen due to a typo in the path, file rotation, corruption, or permission changes. The server gives no indication that mTLS is misconfigured. Version 2.11.1 fixes the vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27586</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hffm-g8v7-wrv7 — Caddy: mTLS client authentication silently fails open when CA certificate file is missing or malformed</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hffm-g8v7-wrv7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two swallowed errors in `ClientAuthentication.provision()` cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `modules/caddytls/connpolicy.go`, the `provision()` method has two `return nil` statements that should be `return err`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Bug #1 — line 787:**
```go
ders, err := convertPEMFilesToDER(fpath)
if err != nil {
    return nil  // BUG: should be &amp;#34;return err&amp;#34;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Bug #2 — line 800:**
```go
err := caPool.Provision(ctx)
if err != nil {
    return nil  // BUG: should be &amp;#34;return err&amp;#34;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with line 811 which correctly returns the error:
```go
caRaw, err := ctx.LoadModule(clientauth, &amp;#34;CARaw&amp;#34;)
if err != nil {
    return err  // CORRECT
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the error is swallowed on line 787, the chain is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `TrustedCACerts` remains empty (no DER data appended from the file)
2. The `len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) &amp;gt; 0` guard on line 794 is false — skipped
3. `clientauth.CARaw` is nil — line 806 returns nil
4. `clientauth.ca` remains nil — no CA pool was created
5. `provision()` returns nil — caller thinks provisioning succeeded&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then in `ConfigureTLSConfig()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;6. `Active()` returns true because `TrustedCACertPEMFiles` is non-empty
7. Default mode is set to `RequireAndVerifyClientCert` (line 860)
8. But `c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two swallowed errors in `ClientAuthentication.provision()` cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `modules/caddytls/connpolicy.go`, the `provision()` method has two `return nil` statements that should be `return err`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Bug #1 — line 787:**
```go
ders, err := convertPEMFilesToDER(fpath)
if err != nil {
    return nil  // BUG: should be &amp;#34;return err&amp;#34;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Bug #2 — line 800:**
```go
err := caPool.Provision(ctx)
if err != nil {
    return nil  // BUG: should be &amp;#34;return err&amp;#34;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with line 811 which correctly returns the error:
```go
caRaw, err := ctx.LoadModule(clientauth, &amp;#34;CARaw&amp;#34;)
if err != nil {
    return err  // CORRECT
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the error is swallowed on line 787, the chain is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `TrustedCACerts` remains empty (no DER data appended from the file)
2. The `len(clientauth.TrustedCACerts) &amp;gt; 0` guard on line 794 is false — skipped
3. `clientauth.CARaw` is nil — line 806 returns nil
4. `clientauth.ca` remains nil — no CA pool was created
5. `provision()` returns nil — caller thinks provisioning succeeded&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then in `ConfigureTLSConfig()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;6. `Active()` returns true because `TrustedCACertPEMFiles` is non-empty
7. Default mode is set to `RequireAndVerifyClientCert` (line 860)
8. But `c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hffm-g8v7-wrv7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-27586</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-27586</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: caddy, Ubuntu:25.10: caddy, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, two swallowed errors in `ClientAuthentication.provision()` cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary. Any deployment using `trusted_ca_cert_file` or `trusted_ca_certs_pem_files` for mTLS will silently degrade to accepting any system-trusted client certificate if the CA file becomes unavailable. This can happen due to a typo in the path, file rotation, corruption, or permission changes. The server gives no indication that mTLS is misconfigured. Version 2.11.1 fixes the vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: caddy, Ubuntu:25.10: caddy, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: caddy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to version 2.11.1, two swallowed errors in `ClientAuthentication.provision()` cause mTLS client certificate authentication to silently fail open when a CA certificate file is missing, unreadable, or malformed. The server starts without error but accepts any client certificate signed by any system-trusted CA, completely bypassing the intended private CA trust boundary. Any deployment using `trusted_ca_cert_file` or `trusted_ca_certs_pem_files` for mTLS will silently degrade to accepting any system-trusted client certificate if the CA file becomes unavailable. This can happen due to a typo in the path, file rotation, corruption, or permission changes. The server gives no indication that mTLS is misconfigured. Version 2.11.1 fixes the vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-27586</guid>
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