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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 16:30:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-06148</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-06148</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-06148</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-06148</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-274836</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-274836</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-274836</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-274836</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-26196</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-26196</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to version 0.14.2, gogs api still accepts tokens in url params like token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers. This issue has been patched in version 0.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to version 0.14.2, gogs api still accepts tokens in url params like token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers. This issue has been patched in version 0.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-26196</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc — Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x9p5-w45c-7ffc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: gogs.io/gogs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as `token` and `access_token`, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- internal/context/auth.go reads `c.Query(&amp;#34;token&amp;#34;)`
  - internal/context/auth.go falls back to `c.Query(&amp;#34;access_token&amp;#34;)`
  - internal/context/auth.go only checks the `Authorization` header when the query token is empty
  - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through `c.IsTokenAuth` checks:
  - internal/route/api/v1/api.go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If tokens are sent in URLs such as `/api/v1/user?token=...`, they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Recommended Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
- A strict referrer policy should be set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remediation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: gogs.io/gogs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as `token` and `access_token`, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- internal/context/auth.go reads `c.Query(&amp;#34;token&amp;#34;)`
  - internal/context/auth.go falls back to `c.Query(&amp;#34;access_token&amp;#34;)`
  - internal/context/auth.go only checks the `Authorization` header when the query token is empty
  - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through `c.IsTokenAuth` checks:
  - internal/route/api/v1/api.go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If tokens are sent in URLs such as `/api/v1/user?token=...`, they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Recommended Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
- A strict referrer policy should be set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remediation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x9p5-w45c-7ffc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-0623 — Gogs: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0623</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gogs ausnutzen, um Daten zu manipulieren, Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriffe durchzuführen oder vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0623</guid>
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