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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 05:12:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-267503</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267503</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-267503</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267503</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-25537</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25537</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;jsonwebtoken is a JWT lib in rust. Prior to version 10.3.0, there is a Type Confusion vulnerability in jsonwebtoken, specifically, in its claim validation logic. When a standard claim (such as nbf or exp) is provided with an incorrect JSON type (Like a String instead of a Number), the library’s internal parsing mechanism marks the claim as “FailedToParse”. Crucially, the validation logic treats this “FailedToParse” state identically to “NotPresent”. This means that if a check is enabled (like: validate_nbf = true), but the claim is not explicitly marked as required in required_spec_claims, the library will skip the validation check entirely for the malformed claim, treating it as if it were not there. This allows attackers to bypass critical time-based security restrictions (like “Not Before” checks) and commit potential authentication and authorization bypasses. This issue has been patched in version 10.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;jsonwebtoken is a JWT lib in rust. Prior to version 10.3.0, there is a Type Confusion vulnerability in jsonwebtoken, specifically, in its claim validation logic. When a standard claim (such as nbf or exp) is provided with an incorrect JSON type (Like a String instead of a Number), the library’s internal parsing mechanism marks the claim as “FailedToParse”. Crucially, the validation logic treats this “FailedToParse” state identically to “NotPresent”. This means that if a check is enabled (like: validate_nbf = true), but the claim is not explicitly marked as required in required_spec_claims, the library will skip the validation check entirely for the malformed claim, treating it as if it were not there. This allows attackers to bypass critical time-based security restrictions (like “Not Before” checks) and commit potential authentication and authorization bypasses. This issue has been patched in version 10.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25537</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h395-gr6q-cpjc — jsonwebtoken has Type Confusion that leads to potential authorization bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h395-gr6q-cpjc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: jsonwebtoken&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It has been discovered that there is a Type Confusion vulnerability in jsonwebtoken, specifically, in its claim validation logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a standard claim (such as nbf or exp) is provided with an incorrect JSON type (Like a String instead of a Number), the library’s internal parsing mechanism marks the claim as “FailedToParse”. Crucially, the validation logic treats this “FailedToParse” state identically to “NotPresent”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that if a check is enabled (like: validate_nbf = true), but the claim is not explicitly marked as required in required_spec_claims, the library will skip the validation check entirely for the malformed claim, treating it as if it were not there. This allows attackers to bypass critical time-based security restrictions (like “Not Before” checks) and commit potential authentication and authorization bypasses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability stems from the interaction between the TryParse enum and the validate function in [src/validation.rs](https://github.com/Keats/jsonwebtoken/blob/master/src/validation.rs).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The TryParse Enum: The library uses a custom TryParse enum to handle claim deserialization:
```
enum TryParse&amp;lt;T&amp;gt; {
    Parsed(T),
    FailedToParse, // Set when deserialization fails (e.g. type mismatch)
    NotPresent,
}
```
If a user sends {“nbf”: “99999999999”} (legacy/string format), serde fails to parse it as u64, and it results in TryParse::FailedToParse.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The Validation Logic Flaw (src/validation.rs): In Validation::…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: jsonwebtoken&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It has been discovered that there is a Type Confusion vulnerability in jsonwebtoken, specifically, in its claim validation logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a standard claim (such as nbf or exp) is provided with an incorrect JSON type (Like a String instead of a Number), the library’s internal parsing mechanism marks the claim as “FailedToParse”. Crucially, the validation logic treats this “FailedToParse” state identically to “NotPresent”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means that if a check is enabled (like: validate_nbf = true), but the claim is not explicitly marked as required in required_spec_claims, the library will skip the validation check entirely for the malformed claim, treating it as if it were not there. This allows attackers to bypass critical time-based security restrictions (like “Not Before” checks) and commit potential authentication and authorization bypasses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability stems from the interaction between the TryParse enum and the validate function in [src/validation.rs](https://github.com/Keats/jsonwebtoken/blob/master/src/validation.rs).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The TryParse Enum: The library uses a custom TryParse enum to handle claim deserialization:
```
enum TryParse&amp;lt;T&amp;gt; {
    Parsed(T),
    FailedToParse, // Set when deserialization fails (e.g. type mismatch)
    NotPresent,
}
```
If a user sends {“nbf”: “99999999999”} (legacy/string format), serde fails to parse it as u64, and it results in TryParse::FailedToParse.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. The Validation Logic Flaw (src/validation.rs): In Validation::…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h395-gr6q-cpjc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-25537</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-25537</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-jsonwebtoken, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-jsonwebtoken, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-jsonwebtoken&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jsonwebtoken is a JWT lib in rust. Prior to version 10.3.0, there is a Type Confusion vulnerability in jsonwebtoken, specifically, in its claim validation logic. When a standard claim (such as nbf or exp) is provided with an incorrect JSON type (Like a String instead of a Number), the library’s internal parsing mechanism marks the claim as “FailedToParse”. Crucially, the validation logic treats this “FailedToParse” state identically to “NotPresent”. This means that if a check is enabled (like: validate_nbf = true), but the claim is not explicitly marked as required in required_spec_claims, the library will skip the validation check entirely for the malformed claim, treating it as if it were not there. This allows attackers to bypass critical time-based security restrictions (like “Not Before” checks) and commit potential authentication and authorization bypasses. This issue has been patched in version 10.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-jsonwebtoken, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-jsonwebtoken, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-jsonwebtoken&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jsonwebtoken is a JWT lib in rust. Prior to version 10.3.0, there is a Type Confusion vulnerability in jsonwebtoken, specifically, in its claim validation logic. When a standard claim (such as nbf or exp) is provided with an incorrect JSON type (Like a String instead of a Number), the library’s internal parsing mechanism marks the claim as “FailedToParse”. Crucially, the validation logic treats this “FailedToParse” state identically to “NotPresent”. This means that if a check is enabled (like: validate_nbf = true), but the claim is not explicitly marked as required in required_spec_claims, the library will skip the validation check entirely for the malformed claim, treating it as if it were not there. This allows attackers to bypass critical time-based security restrictions (like “Not Before” checks) and commit potential authentication and authorization bypasses. This issue has been patched in version 10.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-25537</guid>
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