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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-318631</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318631</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318631</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318631</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-24000</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-24000</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Fleet is open source device management software. Prior to version 4.80.1, Fleet trusted client-supplied IP address headers when determining the source IP for incoming requests. This allowed authenticated and unauthenticated clients to spoof their apparent IP address and bypass per-IP rate limiting controls. Fleet determines a client’s public IP address using HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and/or True-Client-IP. These headers were trusted without validation. An attacker could supply arbitrary values in these headers, causing Fleet to treat each request as originating from a different IP address. This could allow an attacker to bypass per-IP rate limits and increase the effectiveness of brute-force or password-spraying attempts against authentication endpoints. This issue does not allow authentication bypass, privilege escalation, data exposure, or remote code execution on its own. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, run Fleet behind a trusted reverse proxy or load balancer that overwrites client IP headers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Fleet is open source device management software. Prior to version 4.80.1, Fleet trusted client-supplied IP address headers when determining the source IP for incoming requests. This allowed authenticated and unauthenticated clients to spoof their apparent IP address and bypass per-IP rate limiting controls. Fleet determines a client’s public IP address using HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and/or True-Client-IP. These headers were trusted without validation. An attacker could supply arbitrary values in these headers, causing Fleet to treat each request as originating from a different IP address. This could allow an attacker to bypass per-IP rate limits and increase the effectiveness of brute-force or password-spraying attempts against authentication endpoints. This issue does not allow authentication bypass, privilege escalation, data exposure, or remote code execution on its own. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, run Fleet behind a trusted reverse proxy or load balancer that overwrites client IP headers.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-24000</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j8h8-75h3-jg53 — Fleet has a rate limiting bypass via untrusted client IP headers</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j8h8-75h3-jg53</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet trusted client-supplied IP address headers when determining the source IP for incoming requests. This allowed authenticated and unauthenticated clients to spoof their apparent IP address and bypass per-IP rate limiting controls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet determines a client’s public IP address using HTTP headers such as:
- X-Forwarded-For
- X-Real-IP
- True-Client-IP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These headers were trusted without validation. An attacker could supply arbitrary values in these headers, causing Fleet to treat each request as originating from a different IP address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This could allow an attacker to bypass per-IP rate limits and increase the effectiveness of brute-force or password-spraying attempts against authentication endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue does not allow authentication bypass, privilege escalation, data exposure, or remote code execution on its own.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Run Fleet behind a trusted reverse proxy or load balancer that overwrites client IP headers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Email us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)
Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We thank @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet trusted client-supplied IP address headers when determining the source IP for incoming requests. This allowed authenticated and unauthenticated clients to spoof their apparent IP address and bypass per-IP rate limiting controls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet determines a client’s public IP address using HTTP headers such as:
- X-Forwarded-For
- X-Real-IP
- True-Client-IP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These headers were trusted without validation. An attacker could supply arbitrary values in these headers, causing Fleet to treat each request as originating from a different IP address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This could allow an attacker to bypass per-IP rate limits and increase the effectiveness of brute-force or password-spraying attempts against authentication endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue does not allow authentication bypass, privilege escalation, data exposure, or remote code execution on its own.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Run Fleet behind a trusted reverse proxy or load balancer that overwrites client IP headers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Email us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)
Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credits&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We thank @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j8h8-75h3-jg53</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1553 — Fleet: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1553</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Fleet ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1553</guid>
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