https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:36:02 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aqtinstall-cve-2026-23879 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aqtinstall</p> <p>### Summary There exists an **arbitrary file write vulnerability** in `py7zr` (1.1.0, latest), which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using `extractall` to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service.</p> <p>### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is that `py7zr` fails to properly restrict the targets of symbolic links within an archive. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;1806&#34; height=&#34;834&#34; alt=&#34;image&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdd27ddb-ba79-4b20-b8b9-21f3e16a6e8b&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>### PoC #### **Construct PoC Archive File** The following pseudo-code illustrates the vulnerable logic.</p> <p>```python def create_sevenz_exp(output_dir: str): filename = &#34;archive.7z&#34; file_path = output_dir + filename with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, &#39;w&#39;) as archive: archive.writestr(&#34;Some Text&#34;, &#34;dir0/someFi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: aqtinstall</p> <p>### Summary There exists an **arbitrary file write vulnerability** in `py7zr` (1.1.0, latest), which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using `extractall` to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service.</p> <p>### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is that `py7zr` fails to properly restrict the targets of symbolic links within an archive. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;1806&#34; height=&#34;834&#34; alt=&#34;image&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdd27ddb-ba79-4b20-b8b9-21f3e16a6e8b&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>### PoC #### **Construct PoC Archive File** The following pseudo-code illustrates the vulnerable logic.</p> <p>```python def create_sevenz_exp(output_dir: str): filename = &#34;archive.7z&#34; file_path = output_dir + filename with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, &#39;w&#39;) as archive: archive.writestr(&#34;Some Text&#34;, &#34;dir0/someFi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aqtinstall-cve-2026-23879 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330331 EUVD-2026-330331 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330331 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23879 <p>py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Versions 1.1.2 and below contain an an arbitrary file write vulnerability, which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using extractall to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 1.1.3.</p> <p>py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Versions 1.1.2 and below contain an an arbitrary file write vulnerability, which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using extractall to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 1.1.3.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23879 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6rc-2cgv-63h7 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: py7zr</p> <p>### Summary There exists an **arbitrary file write vulnerability** in `py7zr` (1.1.0, latest), which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using `extractall` to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service.</p> <p>### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is that `py7zr` fails to properly restrict the targets of symbolic links within an archive. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;1806&#34; height=&#34;834&#34; alt=&#34;image&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdd27ddb-ba79-4b20-b8b9-21f3e16a6e8b&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>### PoC #### **Construct PoC Archive File** The following pseudo-code illustrates the vulnerable logic.</p> <p>```python def create_sevenz_exp(output_dir: str): filename = &#34;archive.7z&#34; file_path = output_dir + filename with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, &#39;w&#39;) as archive: archive.writestr(&#34;Some Text&#34;, &#34;dir0/someFi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: py7zr</p> <p>### Summary There exists an **arbitrary file write vulnerability** in `py7zr` (1.1.0, latest), which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using `extractall` to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service.</p> <p>### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is that `py7zr` fails to properly restrict the targets of symbolic links within an archive. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;1806&#34; height=&#34;834&#34; alt=&#34;image&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdd27ddb-ba79-4b20-b8b9-21f3e16a6e8b&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>### PoC #### **Construct PoC Archive File** The following pseudo-code illustrates the vulnerable logic.</p> <p>```python def create_sevenz_exp(output_dir: str): filename = &#34;archive.7z&#34; file_path = output_dir + filename with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, &#39;w&#39;) as archive: archive.writestr(&#34;Some Text&#34;, &#34;dir0/someFi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6rc-2cgv-63h7 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11112-1 <p>python311-py7zr-1.1.3-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>python311-py7zr-1.1.3-1.1 on GA media</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11112-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2974 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: py7zr</p> <p>### Summary There exists an **arbitrary file write vulnerability** in `py7zr` (1.1.0, latest), which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using `extractall` to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service.</p> <p>### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is that `py7zr` fails to properly restrict the targets of symbolic links within an archive. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;1806&#34; height=&#34;834&#34; alt=&#34;image&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdd27ddb-ba79-4b20-b8b9-21f3e16a6e8b&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>### PoC #### **Construct PoC Archive File** The following pseudo-code illustrates the vulnerable logic.</p> <p>```python def create_sevenz_exp(output_dir: str): filename = &#34;archive.7z&#34; file_path = output_dir + filename with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, &#39;w&#39;) as archive: archive.writestr(&#34;Some Text&#34;, &#34;dir0/someFi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: py7zr</p> <p>### Summary There exists an **arbitrary file write vulnerability** in `py7zr` (1.1.0, latest), which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using `extractall` to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service.</p> <p>### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is that `py7zr` fails to properly restrict the targets of symbolic links within an archive. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;1806&#34; height=&#34;834&#34; alt=&#34;image&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cdd27ddb-ba79-4b20-b8b9-21f3e16a6e8b&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>### PoC #### **Construct PoC Archive File** The following pseudo-code illustrates the vulnerable logic.</p> <p>```python def create_sevenz_exp(output_dir: str): filename = &#34;archive.7z&#34; file_path = output_dir + filename with py7zr.SevenZipFile(file_path, &#39;w&#39;) as archive: archive.writestr(&#34;Some Text&#34;, &#34;dir0/someFi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2974 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23879 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: py7zr, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: py7zr, Ubuntu:25.10: py7zr, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: py7zr</p> <p>py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Versions 1.1.2 and below contain an an arbitrary file write vulnerability, which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using extractall to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 1.1.3.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: py7zr, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: py7zr, Ubuntu:25.10: py7zr, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: py7zr</p> <p>py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Versions 1.1.2 and below contain an an arbitrary file write vulnerability, which allows symbolic links to be recreated outside the destination directory via crafted malicious symbolic link chains. When using extractall to extract an archive, the library restores these symbolic links, linking them to arbitrary directories on the host file system. During extraction, the program only checks the link arcname within the destination directory, but ignores the combined symlink path resolution. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by constructing malicious archives, thereby bypassing the directory boundary restrictions implemented by the extractor. Subsequent extraction of regular files through these symbolic links can result in arbitrary file writes. This vulnerability may lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, data corruption, or denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 1.1.3.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23879