https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 22:03:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09452 bdu:2026-09452 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-09452 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23394 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23394 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0638 certfr-2026-avi-0638 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0638 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355963 EUVD-2026-355963 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355963 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23394 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.</p> <p>Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.</p> <p>This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a (&#34;af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK&#34;).</p> <p>After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue.</p> <p>The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC.</p> <p>Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.</p> <p>The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B.</p> <p>GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -&gt; true &lt;------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -&gt; sk-A&#39;s file refcount : 1 -&gt; 2</p> <p>close(sk-B) -&gt; sk-B&#39;s file refcount : 2 -&gt; 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -&gt; true</p> <p>Initially, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds.</p> <p>However, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous e…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.</p> <p>Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.</p> <p>This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a (&#34;af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK&#34;).</p> <p>After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue.</p> <p>The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC.</p> <p>Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.</p> <p>The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B.</p> <p>GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -&gt; true &lt;------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -&gt; sk-A&#39;s file refcount : 1 -&gt; 2</p> <p>close(sk-B) -&gt; sk-B&#39;s file refcount : 2 -&gt; 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -&gt; true</p> <p>Initially, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds.</p> <p>However, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous e…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23394 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p5pc-67g7-qcv2 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.</p> <p>Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.</p> <p>This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a (&#34;af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK&#34;).</p> <p>After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue.</p> <p>The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC.</p> <p>Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.</p> <p>The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B.</p> <p>GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -&gt; true &lt;------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -&gt; sk-A&#39;s file refcount : 1 -&gt; 2</p> <p>close(sk-B) -&gt; sk-B&#39;s file refcount : 2 -&gt; 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -&gt; true</p> <p>Initially, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds.</p> <p>However, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous e…</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.</p> <p>Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.</p> <p>This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a (&#34;af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK&#34;).</p> <p>After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue.</p> <p>The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC.</p> <p>Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.</p> <p>The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B.</p> <p>GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -&gt; true &lt;------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -&gt; sk-A&#39;s file refcount : 1 -&gt; 2</p> <p>close(sk-B) -&gt; sk-B&#39;s file refcount : 2 -&gt; 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -&gt; true</p> <p>Initially, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds.</p> <p>However, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous e…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p5pc-67g7-qcv2 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-23394 msrc_CVE-2026-23394 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-23394 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-1862 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel</p> <p>The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>f2fs: fix to detect potential corrupted nid in free_nid_list</p> <p>As reported, on-disk footer.ino and footer.nid is the same and out-of-range, let&amp;apos;s add sanity check on f2fs_alloc_nid() to detect any potential corruption in free_nid_list.(CVE-2025-68315)</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ntfs3: Fix uninit buffer allocated by __getname()</p> <p>Fix uninit errors caused after buffer allocation given to &amp;apos;de&amp;apos;; by initializing the buffer with zeroes. The fix was found by using KMSAN.(CVE-2025-68727)</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>netfilter: nf_tables: fix use-after-free in nf_tables_addchain()</p> <p>nf_tables_addchain() publishes the chain to table-&amp;gt;chains via list_add_tail_rcu() (in nft_chain_add()) before registering hooks. If nf_tables_register_hook() then fails, the error path calls nft_chain_del() (list_del_rcu()) followed by nf_tables_chain_destroy() with no RCU grace period in between.</p> <p>This creates two use-after-free conditions:</p> <p>1) Control-plane: nf_tables_dump_chains() traverses table-&amp;gt;chains under rcu_read_lock(). A concurrent dump can still be walking the chain when the error path frees it.</p> <p>2) Packet path: for NFPROTO_INET, nf_register_net_hook() briefly installs the IPv4 hook before IPv6 registration fails. Packets entering nft…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel</p> <p>The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>f2fs: fix to detect potential corrupted nid in free_nid_list</p> <p>As reported, on-disk footer.ino and footer.nid is the same and out-of-range, let&amp;apos;s add sanity check on f2fs_alloc_nid() to detect any potential corruption in free_nid_list.(CVE-2025-68315)</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>ntfs3: Fix uninit buffer allocated by __getname()</p> <p>Fix uninit errors caused after buffer allocation given to &amp;apos;de&amp;apos;; by initializing the buffer with zeroes. The fix was found by using KMSAN.(CVE-2025-68727)</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>netfilter: nf_tables: fix use-after-free in nf_tables_addchain()</p> <p>nf_tables_addchain() publishes the chain to table-&amp;gt;chains via list_add_tail_rcu() (in nft_chain_add()) before registering hooks. If nf_tables_register_hook() then fails, the error path calls nft_chain_del() (list_del_rcu()) followed by nf_tables_chain_destroy() with no RCU grace period in between.</p> <p>This creates two use-after-free conditions:</p> <p>1) Control-plane: nf_tables_dump_chains() traverses table-&amp;gt;chains under rcu_read_lock(). A concurrent dump can still be walking the chain when the error path frees it.</p> <p>2) Packet path: for NFPROTO_INET, nf_register_net_hook() briefly installs the IPv4 hook before IPv6 registration fails. Packets entering nft…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-1862 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21388-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:21388-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22742-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:22742-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23394 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 139 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened. Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro. This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a (&#34;af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK&#34;). After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue. The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC. Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B. The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B. GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -&gt; true &lt;------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -&gt; sk-A&#39;s file refcount : 1 -&gt; 2 close(sk-B) -&gt; sk-B&#39;s file refcount : 2 -&gt; 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -&gt; true Initially, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds. However, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous evaluation.…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 139 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened. Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro. This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit cbcf01128d0a (&#34;af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK&#34;). After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and reintroduced the same issue. The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without interacting with GC. Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B. The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead() for sk-A and sk-B. GC thread User thread --------- ----------- unix_vertex_dead(sk-A) -&gt; true &lt;------. \ `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK) invalidate !! -&gt; sk-A&#39;s file refcount : 1 -&gt; 2 close(sk-B) -&gt; sk-B&#39;s file refcount : 2 -&gt; 1 unix_vertex_dead(sk-B) -&gt; true Initially, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the same as the number of its inflight fds. However, sk-A&#39;s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK, which invalidates the previous evaluation.…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23394 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0861 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Informationen offenzulegen, weitere nicht spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu verursachen und potentiell Code auszuführen.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Informationen offenzulegen, weitere nicht spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu verursachen und potentiell Code auszuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0861