<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 18:46:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-23088</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-23088</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0166 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0166</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0166</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0166</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-320935</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-320935</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-320935</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-320935</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-23088</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that
had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a
kernel crash occurred:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 ~# echo &amp;#39;s:stack unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state &amp;amp; 3&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task
schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the
sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the
&amp;#34;stack&amp;#34; synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo &amp;#39;s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above makes another synthetic event called &amp;#34;syscall_stack&amp;#34; that
attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and
records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call
that is exiting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo 1 &amp;gt; events/s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that
had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a
kernel crash occurred:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 ~# echo &amp;#39;s:stack unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state &amp;amp; 3&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task
schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the
sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the
&amp;#34;stack&amp;#34; synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo &amp;#39;s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above makes another synthetic event called &amp;#34;syscall_stack&amp;#34; that
attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and
records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call
that is exiting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo 1 &amp;gt; events/s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-23088</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3gp7-mv7f-66rh</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3gp7-mv7f-66rh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that
had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a
kernel crash occurred:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 ~# echo &amp;#39;s:stack unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state &amp;amp; 3&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task
schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the
sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the
&amp;#34;stack&amp;#34; synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo &amp;#39;s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above makes another synthetic event called &amp;#34;syscall_stack&amp;#34; that
attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and
records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call
that is exiting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo 1 &amp;gt; events/s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that
had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a
kernel crash occurred:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 ~# echo &amp;#39;s:stack unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state &amp;amp; 3&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task
schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the
sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the
&amp;#34;stack&amp;#34; synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo &amp;#39;s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; dynamic_events
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger
 ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The above makes another synthetic event called &amp;#34;syscall_stack&amp;#34; that
attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and
records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call
that is exiting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;~# echo 1 &amp;gt; events/s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3gp7-mv7f-66rh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-23088 — tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-23088</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-23088</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-23088</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:20416-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:20416-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:20416-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:0962-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:0962-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2026:0962-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-23088</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 178 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a kernel crash occurred:  ~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing  ~# echo &amp;#39;s:stack unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt; dynamic_events  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state &amp;amp; 3&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34; synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34;).  ~# echo &amp;#39;s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; dynamic_events  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger The above makes another synthetic event called &amp;#34;syscall_stack&amp;#34; that attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call that is exiting. When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):  ~# echo 1 &amp;gt; events/synthetic…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 178 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a kernel crash occurred:  ~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing  ~# echo &amp;#39;s:stack unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt; dynamic_events  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state &amp;amp; 3&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34; synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called &amp;#34;stack&amp;#34;).  ~# echo &amp;#39;s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; dynamic_events  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger  ~# echo &amp;#39;hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)&amp;#39; &amp;gt;&amp;gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger The above makes another synthetic event called &amp;#34;syscall_stack&amp;#34; that attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call that is exiting. When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):  ~# echo 1 &amp;gt; events/synthetic…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-23088</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-0324 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0324</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu einer Denial-of-Service- Bedingung führen oder eine Speicherbeschädigung verursachen können.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, die möglicherweise zu einer Denial-of-Service- Bedingung führen oder eine Speicherbeschädigung verursachen können.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-0324</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
