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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-265403</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265403</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-265403</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265403</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-22705</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22705</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;RustCrypto: Signatures offers support for digital signatures, which provide authentication of data using public-key cryptography. Prior to version 0.1.0-rc.2, a timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.0-rc.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;RustCrypto: Signatures offers support for digital signatures, which provide authentication of data using public-key cryptography. Prior to version 0.1.0-rc.2, a timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.0-rc.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22705</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hcp2-x6j4-29j7 — RustCrypto: Signatures has timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hcp2-x6j4-29j7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ml-dsa&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `(&amp;amp;w - &amp;amp;cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2`
- `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Original Code**:
```rust
fn decompose&amp;lt;TwoGamma2: Unsigned&amp;gt;(self) -&amp;gt; (Elem, Elem) {
    // ...
    let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
    r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;  // Variable-time division on secret-derived data
    (r1, r0)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I do not have an exploit written for this, currently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Replacing division with constant-time Barrett reduction mitigates this risk. Since `TwoGa…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ml-dsa&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `(&amp;amp;w - &amp;amp;cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2`
- `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Original Code**:
```rust
fn decompose&amp;lt;TwoGamma2: Unsigned&amp;gt;(self) -&amp;gt; (Elem, Elem) {
    // ...
    let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
    r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;  // Variable-time division on secret-derived data
    (r1, r0)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I do not have an exploit written for this, currently.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Replacing division with constant-time Barrett reduction mitigates this risk. Since `TwoGa…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hcp2-x6j4-29j7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2025-0144 — Timing side-channel in ML-DSA decomposition</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2025-0144</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ml-dsa&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `(&amp;amp;w - &amp;amp;cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2`
- `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Original Code**:
```rust
fn decompose&amp;lt;TwoGamma2: Unsigned&amp;gt;(self) -&amp;gt; (Elem, Elem) {
    // ...
    let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
    r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;  // Variable-time division on secret-derived data
    (r1, r0)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Integer division was replaced with a constant-time Barrett reduction.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ml-dsa&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A timing side-channel was discovered in the Decompose algorithm which is used during ML-DSA signing to generate hints for the signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The analysis was performed using a constant-time analyzer that examines compiled assembly code for instructions with data-dependent timing behavior. The analyzer flags:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **UDIV/SDIV instructions**: Hardware division instructions have early termination optimizations where execution time depends on operand values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `decompose` function used a hardware division instruction to compute `r1.0 / TwoGamma2::U32`. This function is called during signing through `high_bits()` and `low_bits()`, which process values derived from secret key components:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `(&amp;amp;w - &amp;amp;cs2).low_bits()` where `cs2` is derived from secret key component `s2`
- `Hint::new()` calls `high_bits()` on values derived from secret key component `t0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Original Code**:
```rust
fn decompose&amp;lt;TwoGamma2: Unsigned&amp;gt;(self) -&amp;gt; (Elem, Elem) {
    // ...
    let mut r1 = r_plus - r0;
    r1.0 /= TwoGamma2::U32;  // Variable-time division on secret-derived data
    (r1, r0)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dividend (`r1.0`) is derived from secret key material. An attacker with precise timing measurements could extract information about the signing key by observing timing variations in the division operation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Integer division was replaced with a constant-time Barrett reduction.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2025-0144</guid>
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