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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:45:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-265612</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265612</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-265612</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265612</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-22607</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22607</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python&amp;#39;s cProfile module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses cProfile.run() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling&amp;#39;s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python&amp;#39;s cProfile module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses cProfile.run() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling&amp;#39;s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22607</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p523-jq9w-64x9 — Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p523-jq9w-64x9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: fickling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Fickling&amp;#39;s assessment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Original report&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python&amp;#39;s `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a user relies on Fickling&amp;#39;s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling&amp;#39;s block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incriminated source code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reference to similar fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How the bypass works:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`
2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
3.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: fickling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Fickling&amp;#39;s assessment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Original report&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python&amp;#39;s `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a user relies on Fickling&amp;#39;s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling&amp;#39;s block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incriminated source code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reference to similar fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How the bypass works:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`
2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
3.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p523-jq9w-64x9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-1371 — Fickling Blocklist Bypass: cProfile.run()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1371</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: fickling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Fickling&amp;#39;s assessment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Original report&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python&amp;#39;s `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a user relies on Fickling&amp;#39;s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling&amp;#39;s block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incriminated source code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reference to similar fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How the bypass works:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`
2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
3.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: fickling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Fickling&amp;#39;s assessment&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Original report&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python&amp;#39;s `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a user relies on Fickling&amp;#39;s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling&amp;#39;s block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incriminated source code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- File: `fickling/analysis.py`
- Class: `UnsafeImports`
- Issue: The blocklist does not include `cProfile`, `cProfile.run`, or `cProfile.runctx`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reference to similar fix:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR #187 added `pty` to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
- PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for `cProfile`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How the bypass works:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker creates a pickle using `cProfile.run()` in `__reduce__`
2. `cProfile.run()` accepts a Python code string and executes it directly (C-accelerated version of profile.run)
3.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1371</guid>
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