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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-355216</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355216</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-355216</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-355216</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-19671</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19671</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19671</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm&amp;#39;s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn&amp;#39;t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g</guid>
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      <title>ICSA-26-230-01 — CISA Malcolm</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/icsa-26-230-01</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. Prior to version 26.07.0, safe-extract.py extracts uploaded archives with no limit on entry count, directory depth, total entries, or output size. A small malicious archive containing a large number of directory or file entries causes the filebeat processing container to create an unbounded number of filesystem objects, exhausting inodes or filesystem metadata and denying service to the processing pipeline and any service sharing the same mount. Version 26.07.0 fixes the issue. Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. Prior to version 26.07.0, safe-extract.py protects file extraction with libarchive&amp;#39;s secure flags, but creates directory entries with a raw os.makedirs(os.path.join(dest, entry.pathname)) that has no traversal protection. An uploaded malicious archive containing a directory entry with a ../ sequence or an absolute path causes the filebeat processing container to create directories outside the intended extraction directory. Version 26.07.0 fixes the issue. Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at POST /server/php/submit.php and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (file-upload/php/config.php:16), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the .php extension inta…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. Prior to version 26.07.0, safe-extract.py extracts uploaded archives with no limit on entry count, directory depth, total entries, or output size. A small malicious archive containing a large number of directory or file entries causes the filebeat processing container to create an unbounded number of filesystem objects, exhausting inodes or filesystem metadata and denying service to the processing pipeline and any service sharing the same mount. Version 26.07.0 fixes the issue. Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. Prior to version 26.07.0, safe-extract.py protects file extraction with libarchive&amp;#39;s secure flags, but creates directory entries with a raw os.makedirs(os.path.join(dest, entry.pathname)) that has no traversal protection. An uploaded malicious archive containing a directory entry with a ../ sequence or an absolute path causes the filebeat processing container to create directories outside the intended extraction directory. Version 26.07.0 fixes the issue. Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at POST /server/php/submit.php and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (file-upload/php/config.php:16), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the .php extension inta…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/icsa-26-230-01</guid>
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