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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-332404</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-332404</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-332404</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-332404</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-14440</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-14440</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer&amp;#39;s zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. &amp;#39;issue &amp;#34;letsencrypt.org&amp;#34;&amp;#39; without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Tr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer&amp;#39;s zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. &amp;#39;issue &amp;#34;letsencrypt.org&amp;#34;&amp;#39; without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Tr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-14440</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vrv9-rjp4-w93c</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vrv9-rjp4-w93c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer&amp;#39;s zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. &amp;#39;issue &amp;#34;letsencrypt.org&amp;#34;&amp;#39; without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Tr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer&amp;#39;s zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. &amp;#39;issue &amp;#34;letsencrypt.org&amp;#34;&amp;#39; without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare&amp;#39;s authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Tr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vrv9-rjp4-w93c</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>VA-26-183-01 — Cloudflare Universal SSL CAA record override</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/va-26-183-01</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cloudflare Universal SSL adds Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS records that override user-configured CAA records. The Universal SSL CAA records may be more permissive than user-configured records, for example, overriding the RFC 8657 &amp;#39;accounturi&amp;#39; parameter. An attacker with appropriate network access may be able to spoof domain validation and obtain a certificate for the target domain.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Cloudflare Universal SSL adds Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS records that override user-configured CAA records. The Universal SSL CAA records may be more permissive than user-configured records, for example, overriding the RFC 8657 &amp;#39;accounturi&amp;#39; parameter. An attacker with appropriate network access may be able to spoof domain validation and obtain a certificate for the target domain.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/va-26-183-01</guid>
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