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      <title>EUVD-2026-407291</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407291</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407291</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-130627</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-130627</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project&amp;#39;s own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a &amp;#34;fix introduced the bug&amp;#34; variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project&amp;#39;s own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a &amp;#34;fix introduced the bug&amp;#34; variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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